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ABSTRACT 
 
As reliance on social media, mobile devices, and computers has grown in developed nations 
worldwide, data centers have become an important, but poorly understood, part of this digital 
age. These massive structures, which are increasingly built in rural areas, store digital files and 
images. Despite the clear importance of cloud computing, geographers have not studied this 
infrastructure or its effect on nearby communities and the physical environment. This project 
examines the social and environmental impacts of the development and operation of data centers, 
using a Facebook data center in Prineville, Oregon as a case study. It explores what impact the 
technology industry has on local social and natural environment, as well as the broader 
implications of data center operations. It also seeks to situate data centers within increasingly 
common visions of sustainable businesses and ‘greening’ capitalism. Through interviews with 
Facebook managers, town officials, and local citizens, I came to several conclusions about such 
data centers. First, big data companies have tried to accommodate local concerns about the 
facilities and to integrate them within the social fabric of the communities where they are built 
and operated. Consequently, in the short-term, they appear to have little or no impact on the 
social life of local citizens. Second, the environmental impacts of data centers are difficult to 
determine at a global scale. While big data companies invest in ‘green’ energy, they share little 
information about their waste disposal and recycling, and the amount of space these buildings 
require is growing. Finally, by following the tenets of sustainable enterprise, these companies 
have sought to minimize potential negative social and environmental impacts of data center 
operation, resulting in greater profits and sustainability, as well as a more positive public image. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
CATCHING THE CLOUD 
 
 
It was a hot summer day in June 2017, and after a three hour drive from Portland, I had finally 
made it to the outskirts of Prineville, a town of about 9,000 people in Central Oregon. The land 
adjacent to the road was covered in sand, junipers, and sagebrush. I drove past a tiny private 
airport on my left, before approaching an industrial park, mostly consisting of warehouse 
buildings and trailers. Having typed ‘Facebook data center’ into my iPhone’s GPS, I followed 
Siri’s directions to turn left down Tom McCall Road. In the distance loomed a large warehouse-
like building with a tall black fence bordering the property. A blue Facebook sign, proudly 
displayed amongst the desert shrubs, greeted me. I angled the truck toward the entrance, but 
seeing the security guard in the booth nearby, I changed my mind as I did not want to appear 
suspicious. I parked in the construction lot across the road. The data center was enormous, the 
size of an Olympic stadium (about 475,000 square feet), but still seemed stylish and new. I 
wanted to take pictures of the data center’s manicured exterior—unexpectedly complementary to 
the desert setting—but I soon realized that the guard in front of the building was staring at me. I 
decided I had better not take any photos after all and headed into downtown Prineville. 
 I was immediately surprised by how far removed the data center was from downtown. 
Heading back out onto Route 126, I found myself descending a mountain on a winding road that 
overlooked Prineville. I could see the entire town from the viewpoint above (Figure 1). There 
were acres of surprisingly lush green grass to my right, a stark contrast to the dry desert 
dominating the rest of the landscape. I later found out that this was Prineville’s (heavily 
irrigated) Meadow Lakes Golf Course. When I got to the bottom of the valley, things looked 
about as I expected they would in a small rural Western town: plenty of barbeque restaurants and 
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bars, a few gas stations, and several mom-and-pop stores along North Main Street. The quaint 
city hall and courthouse were located within twenty feet of one another, adjacent to two small 
parks. Few people milled about on the sidewalks, and all the traffic was concentrated onto the 
single highway going through town. Trucks and trailers were parked on all the side streets, and 
several families sat outside the Tastee Treat, enjoying some ice cream in attempt to beat the 
summer heat.  
 
 
Figure 1. Prineville, Oregon, from the scenic viewpoint on the hill above town. The 
Facebook data center is directly behind the site, about half a mile from where this 
photo was taken. Photo by author. 
 
 I pulled into a parking spot near the city courthouse, pleasantly surprised that there was 
not a single parking meter in sight. I crossed the street to get a better look around, a driver 
stopping to let me walk in front of him. I found myself warming to the cozy feel of the town, but 
something struck me as odd about it. There was certainly a lot of obvious Western stereotypes 
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here, manifested in benches engraved with cowboys, signs for an upcoming rodeo, and dusty 
mountains looming in the distance; yet there was something that seemed ephemeral about these 
things. What struck me as unusual was the juxtaposition in Prineville between the stereotypically 
small-town things it harbored and the amenities I was used to seeing everywhere else. For 
instance, next to the town’s only motel was a Best Western Inn. Down the street from Les 
Schwabs Tire Center and a small church was a Chase bank, a Starbucks, and a Sears’s 
department store. The golden arches of McDonalds jutted out above the locally owned Oochoco 
Brewing Co. restaurant sign (Figure 2). Prineville also seemed at odds with the sleek, manicured 
Facebook data center campus, hidden high on the hill overlooking the little town (Figure 3). 
Prineville thus appeared to straddle two identities at once: a rural Western town and a miniature 
city you could find anywhere else in the United States. I could not help but wonder what this 
meant for its future. What impacts would big data have on this town’s ability to retain its current 
small-town character? 
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Figure 2. Sites on NW 3rd Street in Prineville, Oregon. This is the main road that 
brings people through town on one of two highways running through Prineville, 
Highway 26. The chain stores and local venues are intermingled along the road, a 
mix of old and new infrastructure and style. Photos by author. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. A view of the Facebook data center from Tom McCall Road in Prineville, 
Oregon. The bulldozers located around the site are a constant presence. Plans for 
construction of a fourth data center are currently underway. Photo by author. 
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 The Facebook data center raises many questions about Prineville. But the story is not 
necessarily unique to this town as these facilities are increasingly common in more and more 
rural places. The reason I originally became interested in Prineville was not because it has that 
‘small-town charm’ to which I am partial, but because I hoped it could provide a concrete 
example of a larger phenomenon: the construction of resource-hungry data centers that consume 
land, water, and energy across the United States. When I learned about electronic waste (e-
waste) and how dirty technology production can be through other research projects, I wondered 
what effect our everyday use of the internet and the ‘cloud’ could have in the real world. The 
cloud is a seemingly boundless and illusory space that promises to keep our information safe 
forever (Carruth 2014). As more people are becoming addicted to technological gadgets and 
virtual reality, they have begun to use the cloud to store pictures, videos, documents, and other 
files. Moreover, large corporations, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), also require 
safe and secure locations for their information (Hogan 2015). As a result, we face a growing 
need to store all of these data somewhere (Starosielski and Walker 2016). The cloud appears to 
have endless space, as our data are sent to live in an invisible sky. Yet, I knew there had to be 
some material impacts big data companies do not allow us to see. All the things that go onto the 
cloud seemed to disappear into the abyss, but that could not be the end of the story. So, I set out 
to catch the cloud and find where it lived. As I discovered, the cloud has a real, physical, 
geographical presence that has real material impacts on human and environmental health. The 
cloud dwells within the infrastructure of remote data centers.  
 
In the last few years, big data companies like Facebook have rapidly constructed data 
centers across the world. Facebook has already constructed hyper-scale data centers in ten 
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locations over the past decade—seven of which began construction within the past two years—
and another will be added shortly (Karkaria 2018). There are generally at least four data centers 
per location, stretching up to 400,000 square feet each (Data Center Knowledge 2010). Although 
many data centers are located in cities, they are increasingly common in small rural towns that 
have experienced the hardship of recent economic downturns (Pickren 2016). These buildings, 
often compared to war bunkers (Brennan 2016), require copious amounts of energy and 
resources to store and protect data. They have a substantial footprint in terms of land, water, and 
energy use. Data centers require roughly the same amount of electricity as a small city and 
consume millions of gallons of water each day to cool their servers (Hogan 2015). Many data 
centers also receive power from grids reliant upon the burning of fossil fuels for energy 
(Greenpeace 2011). As a result, the seemingly abstract technological space of the cloud may 
actually contribute to climate change through its physical infrastructure (Hogan 2013). 
Greenpeace brought this issue to light in their recent and ongoing campaign, Click 
Clean.1 In response, companies like Facebook, Apple, and Google have tried to promote an 
environmentally-friendly image of their data centers by posting photos and videos of the ‘green’ 
and highly efficient buildings they have constructed in various parts of the world (e.g. Google’s 
YouTube video on their new center in Hamina, Finland)2. Facebook, as part of the Open 
Compute Project, has created a special profile for each data center that proudly displays their 
‘power-usage effectiveness’ (PUE). PUE supposedly shows the efficiency of internal operations 
for a given location (Burrington 2015). However, some have deemed PUE an essentially useless 
measurement of environmental impact because it gives no specific details about the amount of 
energy and water these data centers are using (Hogan 2013; Burrington 2015). Moreover, as 
media studies scholar Mél Hogan (2015) suggests, data centers are problematic in that not only 
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are they rapidly increasing in number, but the resource- and energy-intensive characteristics they 
have in common have also become normalized. Clearly, data centers are complex spaces 
involving internal and external dynamics that have material and immaterial, as well as social and 
environmental impacts that are worth studying. 
 
With my preliminary research on data centers, I quickly learned that my suspicions had 
been correct. We are being purposely fed select information by big data companies like 
Facebook, Apple, and Google, which allows them to continue their monopoly on information 
and its infrastructure (Foer 2017). The cloud, even as it seems to be nowhere, is right there in 
peoples’ backyards, housed inauspiciously in industrial buildings like any other and using water, 
power, and land. How could this be? Considering the fact that people are so unaware of data 
centers, what exactly are the environmental and social consequences of this infrastructure for the 
communities in which they are located? 
My curiosity and concerns about data centers led me to Oregon. Prineville, Oregon was 
the first of many small rural communities that Facebook adopted as home for the company’s 
numerous data centers. The year 2010 was the beginning of an emergent trend to move data 
storage beyond city borders and into more rural areas (Streep 2017). Prineville, like many towns 
in the rural West, is a resource-dependent community with symbols of traditional Western 
culture (i.e. rodeos, pig roundups, barbeques, parades, etc.) but is also very much part of the 
twenty-first century. According to local officials, almost everyone there owns a cell phone and 
can easily access the internet. Not so long ago, however, the town was at risk of economic 
collapse—that is, until Facebook and Apple decided to invest in their dying town (City of 
Prineville 2017). Nonetheless, the ultimate fate of Prineville still remains in question. What will 
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a little community like Prineville look like twenty years after big data comes to town? Taking all 
these thoughts and questions into consideration, I decided to use Prineville as my case study, 
representative of the larger trend of data centers moving into to rural towns worldwide (Data 
Center Knowledge 2010). I hoped Prineville would help me show what these data centers really 
were and what they might be doing the unique areas in which they now reside. 
 
Research Questions and Methodology 
With my newfound knowledge about the material impacts of data centers in mind, I developed 
five primary research questions. First, what impacts does data center operation have on the 
social character of Prineville? I assumed that there would be tension between the incoming data 
center employees and long-term residents and ranchers in the town who may have conflicting 
interests with regards to natural resource use. Moreover, the rodeos and other stereotypically 
Western activities seemingly cherished by Prineville residents would appear to be at odds with 
the high-tech, trendy culture of Silicon Valley. Big data companies elicit images of fast-paced 
businesses, always updating to the latest and best version of technological gadgetry and software. 
Prineville moves a lot slower. To verify (or disprove) my assumptions about socio-cultural 
tensions, I utilized the month I spent in Prineville to complete nine formal interviews with local 
officials and numerous informal interviews with local residents. The contrast between the formal 
and informal interviews was telling, and doing both greatly helped me understand Prineville’s 
story, both presently and perhaps in the future. I also spent hours walking around Prineville, 
sitting in its parks and stopping in various shops. I tried to immerse myself in Prineville’s 
community during my stay, constantly looking and listening to gain an understanding of what 
  9 
makes the town its own. Observation gave me equally as much information as the online 
resources I read about Prineville’s development. 
My second research question was, what impact does the operation of data centers have 
on the physical environment? It is clear that these data centers are water-, energy-, and land-
intensive (Hogan 2015), but perhaps Facebook and Apple have succeeded in their carbon-neutral 
efforts and have been mitigating their footprints? I had to dig a bit deeper to answer this 
question. While Facebook is very open about the majority of their data center operations, they 
are still not entirely willing to give out too much information about the exact amount of any 
resources they use. To understand the full scope of their environmental impact, I travelled to 
Prineville in June 2017 to tour the data center. I was hoping to get specific numbers and figures 
about their resource use, but not only was it nearly impossible to get a tour of the data center, 
when I finally secured one, my tour guide was also not allowed to give out information about the 
water and electricity usage of the building. I received limited information from Facebook’s 
Public Relations Manager, but it was not quite enough. I worked around Facebook’s barriers by 
interviewing local officials, and reading online information about water usage. I also read books 
and legal documents that explained land-use planning for Prineville and the surrounding area. 
For my third and fourth questions, I wanted to take a step back and look at how 
Prineville’s story fit into larger global trends. My fourth question was thus, are data centers 
representative of a shift toward a form of sustainable enterprise that values both nature and 
technology equally? Often the environment and technology are seen as opposing forces (Bess 
2003); yet corporations like Facebook and Apple have publically announced that they are 
investing in improvements to their facilities to combat climate change (Bell 2017). However, it is 
unclear whether the cloud’s physical infrastructure is truly sustainable. To answer this question, I 
  10 
read about the founders of Facebook and Apple and what likely influenced them as their 
companies grew. I searched through news articles and information from the Breakthrough 
Institute, in addition to reading books on the American counterculture and ‘green capitalism.’ 
The deep-rooted green visions of Facebook and Apple became clear through this research. 
My final question was, is Prineville representative of the larger trend of developing data 
centers, particularly in rural areas? Although Prineville has its own unique character and 
identity, it has had eight years to grow and change (or perhaps, stay the same) as a result of data 
center construction. This is a time period longer than any other small rural town hosting a 
Facebook data center. It could therefore potentially display what will happen to other similar 
communities worldwide. This question was perhaps my most challenging to answer. The 
problem is that the phenomenon of rural data center construction is so new that other towns have 
yet to see many impacts at all, social, environmental, or otherwise. Consequently, much of what I 
have to say about the fate of the towns in which Facebook and/or Apple have chosen to locate is 
based on online articles published by local newspapers. I set up a ‘Google Alert’ for articles 
containing “Facebook ‘data center,’” and had numerous journalistic pieces documenting the 
latest developments on data center construction in small rural towns like Prineville delivered to 
my email inbox each day. By reading this ‘grey literature,’ I am able to make some speculations 
about both Prineville and the other towns where Facebook has chosen to locate. What follows is 
an outline of my journey toward answering my research questions. 
 
Thesis Outline 
The first chapter of this work is a literature review. It begins by briefly surveying what little 
research has been done on data centers in disciplines other than geography. I note the few 
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scholars who have begun to study data centers in the way researchers have yet to examine them, 
adding my own questions and research to their conversation. I suggest that geographers should 
study data centers because it is well-aligned with the field’s methodology and concerns, 
particularly with those of urban and first-world political ecology. I describe two primary sets of 
literature that lay the foundation of my thesis: scholarship on the New West and urban political 
ecology (UPE). I show how my work will contribute to and advance scholarship in these sub-
fields. 
 The second chapter, entitled ‘Rebooting a Town: Visions of Development in the Digital 
Age,’ tells the story of Prineville’s economic development since the 1960s. Drawing upon New 
West scholarship, I compare Prineville to the nearby city Bend, Oregon and that community’s 
recent reliance on tourism to support its local economy. My concern in this chapter is whether or 
not Prineville has made what Hal Rothman (1998) calls a ‘Devil’s Bargain.’ A devil’s bargain in 
Rothman’s view is the demise of a community’s preexisting culture as a result of their decision 
to rebuild their economy on tourism (Rothman 1998). Similar to the communities in Rothman’s 
book, Prineville is a town in transition from a resource-dependent economy to something new. 
Yet unlike those communities, Prineville has not chosen tourism as its redeemer. So, the ultimate 
question becomes whether or not data centers will bring about the same (negative) socio-cultural 
transformations as tourism. I suggest that Prineville, by relying on data centers instead, has been 
able to strike a delicate balance between the Old and the New in what could be called the ‘New 
West 2.0’. I conclude this chapter by specifying what this balancing act may mean for the future 
of Prineville.  
 I chose to call the third chapter, ‘The Nature of Data Centers,’ because it aims to reveal 
the material environmental impacts of data centers. In this chapter I discuss the large footprint of 
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data centers, using information from company reports, government documents, and journalists. I 
divide the chapter into five parts: land, energy, water, waste, and sustainability. I also note the 
minimal data about data centers available to the public, especially with regards to pollution and 
electronic waste (e-waste). This chapter suggests that the scale at which data centers’ impacts are 
examined is what ultimately shows whether or not this industry is as sustainable as it presents 
itself to be. 
 Chapter Four, ‘Shades of Green: Ecomodernist Visions of the Future,’ discusses the 
foundation of data centers and why they currently seem to have a minimal impact on human and 
environmental health. I describe how the founders of big data companies have ‘green visions,’ 
with roots in Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog and its countercultural technophilia from the 
1960s and 1970s. Data centers are the result of a worshipful trust in technology’s ability to 
overcome capitalism’s tendency to harm the environment, and following the tenants of what has 
been deemed the ‘ecomodernist’ movement. The ‘greenness’ of data centers is reflective of these 
roots and the green ethos of the big data companies that own them. Green data centers are also 
manifestations of the New West 2.0, a version of the American West that balances the Old and 
New, the traditional and the modern, and does not regard technological development and 
environmentalism as mutually exclusive. These companies have made sustainability part of their 
business model by investing in renewable energy, funding local events, and boosting the 
economy in small communities across the United States. Yet, as I note in this chapter, greenness 
is also about making money. Companies like Facebook and Apple are large industrial 
corporations that have a lot of power over our everyday lives, and their true motives are not 
entirely clear. As such, I argue that data centers are representative of the ambiguity present in the 
increasingly global ‘light-green society’ described by Michael Bess (2003). Data centers make it 
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possible to balance mass consumption with environmentalism—a seemingly contradictory and 
precarious balance that may or may not be sustainable. 
 I conclude my thesis by reiterating the important messages I have come to understand 
through my research on data centers. I return to the question of whether or not Prineville has in 
fact made a ‘Devil’s Bargain’ with big data by considering what the future holds for the little 
town. I also suggest opportunities for more scholarly research projects similar to my own. 
Although data center construction has yet to catch the attention of more than a handful of 
scholars, my work contributes to what I hope will be the beginning of more intensive research 
that must be done to understand the larger issue at hand. Ultimately, we would be wise to 
continue studying the material impacts of data centers before those impacts become too great to 
reverse. 
 
Notes 
1. “#ClickClean.” Greenpeace, 2017. Accessed 24 September 2017, 
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/global-warming/click-clean/. 
 
2. “Google’s Hamina Data center,” YouTube video, 2:10, posted by Google green, May 23, 
2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VChOEvKicQQ. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
TOWARD A GEOGRAPHY OF DATA CENTERS 
 
 
On October 25, 2006 Kristina Shevory from The New York Times published an online article 
entitled, “Cultivating Server Farms.” In this article, Shevory discusses how data centers were just 
beginning to emerge as an important industry in the United States. At least partially in response 
to Hurricane Katrina and the loss of crucial security information by numerous companies, cloud 
usage was starting to grow rapidly (Shevory 2006). Additionally, Facebook had launched its site 
for the first time in 2005, and an increasingly large number of people were signing up and 
creating profiles (Philips 2007). Consequently, data companies were pleasantly surprised that a 
seemingly stagnant industry was growing quickly. Since then, the data center industry has 
become a thriving business (Data Center Knowledge 2010). The rapid rise of social media and 
data storage needs has had numerous implications for the way we identify ourselves and the 
world around us (Knight and Weedon 2014); and yet, despite the attention they have been given 
in the news since the early 2000s, data centers have drawn surprisingly little attention from 
scholars. 
The academic literature on data centers is sparse, and the majority of studies focus on 
aspects of the material infrastructure that are ephemeral and abstract. Knowledge about these 
energy-intensive buildings is only just emerging, predominantly through the work of 
investigative journalists hoping to reveal the dark secrets of social media’s contribution to 
climate change (e.g. The Atlantic’s “Beneath the Cloud” series1).  Big data companies cleverly 
maintained the metaphor of the cloud as an abstract space (as opposed to a physical place) for 
many years, and some still do. Journalists however, have revealed in plain terms the immensity 
of the environmental problem at hand (e.g. Carlise 2013; Burrington 2015; Terdiman 2017). The 
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stories journalists tell are short and often open-ended because the towns in which data centers 
exist have yet to see the full impacts of these buildings on their social lives and the local 
environment. Consequently, journalists are able to report the big news about data centers 
popping up across the U.S., but these are surface-level analyses stating the obvious: data center 
operation seems like it will be good for these towns’ economies (e.g. Boykin 2017; Hardy 2017). 
The narrow scope of these articles stems from the fact that journalists simply have neither time 
nor space to engage fully with scholarly work to inform the stories they tell.  
Unlike journalism, academic data center literature is not nearly fully developed, and 
forward progress is slow. The very nature of data centers as both real and virtual spaces requires 
that research crosses disciplinary boundaries. Their impacts are neither just physical or social, 
nor spatial or temporal, but a mix of everything at once. Much of the existing literature is 
technical, where scholars note the intensive energy use of data centers, but fail to engage with the 
associated social or political dimensions this infrastructure can bring about (e.g. Koomey 2007; 
Kliazovich et al. 2010). One relatively well-developed body of literature comes from media 
studies, specifically through work on media infrastructure and sustainability. In contrast, while 
geographers have conducted some research on digital media in general, they have largely ignored 
these complex physical spaces. As a result, the specific sets of geography-based literature with 
which my thesis project engages are first world political ecology (FWPE), urban political 
ecology (UPE), and the New West scholarship. Though these three bodies of literature have not 
explicitly acknowledged one another—nor data centers or the cloud—in this chapter I show that 
there are overlaps that forward important ideas related to my own work on data centers and 
technology as a whole. 
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What follows, then, is a review of academic literature concerning data centers and 
relevant scholarship. I begin by describing the work of media and communication scholars, 
showcasing the important, though non-exhaustive work that has been completed in these fields. I 
then highlight the minimal research done by geographers, noting the many gaps and 
opportunities I find in it. I explain the potential for a data center discourse that combines ideas 
from FWPE, UPE and scholarship on the New West. Finally, I conclude this review by 
describing the importance of my own research and why we must study the geography of data 
centers. 
 
Media and Communication Studies 
Media studies has historically been somewhat silent on physical environmental matters, with a 
few notable exceptions. Richard Maxwell and Toby Miller (2012, p. 11) divide media studies 
scholarship into two broad groups: 1) “a cult of humanism” that focuses on “media technology as 
an enabler of human understanding”, and 2) “a cult of scientism” that aims to “break down 
components of machines and study the entirety of communication.” In my preliminary 
engagement with media studies literature, their generalization appears to hold true. There seems 
to be a multitude of humanistic studies that examine privacy, surveillance, and policy issues 
related to social media and its dissemination (Cohen 2008; Hogan 2013; Stoycheff 2016). These 
scholars tend to be either optimistic about the potential of social media to help generate political 
changes, or wary of its power to allow people and/or corporations to surveil others. Their 
arguments remain in the abstract world of digital media however, failing to acknowledge the 
material infrastructure that allows social media and its users their newfound political and social 
power. 
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Relatedly, some scholarly discourse surrounding capitalism and ‘digital labor’ associated 
with social media is ongoing (e.g. Fuchs 2010; Fisher 2010; Fish and Srinivasan 2011). This 
literature is mainly theoretical and makes little, if any mention of the real environmental impacts 
of media and the cloud. The central claim is that we are experiencing a ‘third wave’ of 
capitalism, which some theorists are calling ‘information capitalism’ (Webster 2000; Arvidsson 
and Colleoni 2012), or similarly, ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Scott 2014; Mahmoudi and Levenda 
2016). Scholars argue that due to the overflow of technological devices and the rise of Web 2.0 
(i.e. user-generated content), a new form of labor and means of production have developed, one 
that is immaterial and digital (Fuchs 2010; Fisher 2010; Fish and Srinivasan 2011). Some believe 
that this labor is another form of capitalist exploitation, while others see it as a force for 
democratization. This literature, too, remains ungrounded, as it never quite manages to put this 
so-called ‘digital labor’ and production in a physical place to which it owes its existence: the data 
center. 
Perhaps the most useful insights media studies provides stem from research by authors 
who specifically examine the question of whether or not media can be made ‘sustainable.’ These 
scholars note how using the cloud for storage (as opposed to a bulky hard-drive, for example) is 
cast as ‘being green;’ however, this ‘greenness’ is counteracted, as the energy-intensive 
structures in which the cloud resides contribute to climate change (Bozak 2011; Maxwell and 
Miller 2012; Hogan 2013; Parks and Starosielski 2015). Paradoxically, these scholars contend 
that social media—even as it may harm the environment—is also a space for social cohesion and 
collaboration. The cloud is a medium through which social movements can garner support via 
social media platforms, including the environmental movement. Thus, hiding behind its label of 
inherent sustainability, the cloud is able to simultaneously save and harm the environment 
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unbeknownst to users (Bozak 2011; Brennan 2016). These scholars recognize the metaphor of 
the cloud as a way of shielding us from the material impacts of every video and photo we post. 
Our apparently virtual actions are contained in physical infrastructures that have potential to 
pollute the earth. As Allison Carruth (2014, pp. 340-342) puts it, “the vision of the Internet as a 
green space at once everywhere and nowhere in particular is pervasive… multinational 
corporations like Microsoft and Google represent the digital cloud as an ethereal system for 
communication and connection, itself without a footprint.” This representation is problematic for 
obvious reasons. We cannot save the environment if we do not know we are harming it. 
Evidently, the media studies literature is rich with valuable insights, but overall it does 
not specifically examine the physical spaces/places in where the cloud resides. That said, media 
scholar Mél Hogan, who has actually studied social media and data centers, sets a good example. 
Hogan both theorizes about the nature of these spaces, as well as states their very real 
environmental impacts. As she asserts, “Most users are unaware of the processes involved in 
being online, where a simple Facebook status update can travel thousands of kilometers in 
Internet conduits through numerous data centers… the Internet has completely thwarted our 
notion of time and of space” (Hogan 2013, p. 9). Hogan, even as a media scholar, makes it clear 
that data centers lend themselves to geographic analysis. Nonetheless, unfortunately, 
geographers have yet to realize the importance of studying the cloud and data centers. As I will 
discuss in the next section, however, there are two sets of literature from geography that do 
provide some useful tools with which data centers could be analyzed. 
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Geography 
Geographers have barely scratched the surface of understanding the geography of social media 
or the cloud, let alone the data centers in which it resides. Matthew Zook (2006) and others have 
noted the complexity of the internet as a space with multiple geographies, in both its material 
infrastructure and the immaterial connectivity it provides, but what of social media and the cloud 
specifically? Media geography has closely examined many various forms of media in terms of 
space and place, including photography, film, radio, video games, and the internet (Adams et al. 
2014). Social media is only just emerging as a topic of discussion. Early work by media 
geographers centered primarily on communications, namely sender-receiver transmission. More 
recently however, focus has shifted towards “power relations [that] are embedded in spaces and 
places through communications” (Adams et al. 2014, 2). In essence, the majority of media 
geography scholars continue to take a theoretical approach to understanding space and place in 
the abstract world of media communication. 
Although a few media geographers have briefly touched upon the cloud, they have yet to 
consider the cloud’s specific physical geography. For instance, as Darren Purcell (2014, p.142) 
states in his chapter on the internet, “Observers of cloud computing imply that the cloud is 
everywhere, and yet bracket out the immense infrastructure necessary to access the cloud 
everywhere…yet the infrastructure is quite mappable.” Purcell’s words are promising, but he 
then moves on to discuss communication networks and power relations in the abstract, rather 
than examining the material infrastructure in which the cloud itself resides. Relatedly, regarding 
social media, geographers have theorized a so-called ‘information society’ and ‘network society’ 
that the internet and its associated technology have created (Castells 1996; 1997; Warf 2014). 
Scholars engaging with this discourse examine the construction of the ‘networked self’ and the 
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complex, seemingly boundless geographies that social media facilitates (Warf 2014). Again, 
these studies include interesting and important insights, but they fail to examine the material 
places and spaces that allow the transformations of self and of power relations to occur. 
Similarly, communications geography has also dabbled in research related to the digital 
media and social media networks, but this sub-field too has yet to concern itself with the real 
environmental impacts of social media and its infrastructure. For example, Paul Adams and 
colleagues (2017) published a collection of work by media and communication scholars that 
never even mentions the cloud. The authors state in the introduction, “Media practices, 
processes, and figures are deeply grounded in materiality and are themselves necessarily bound 
to material forms” (p. 6), and yet no scholar’s work in their collection acknowledges the 
physicality of social media embodied in data centers. Instead, the majority of their chapters 
contain abstract theories about flows of information and knowledge in the digital age—a vital 
discourse with which to engage, but one that also fails to bring social media back down to earth. 
 Still other geographers have examined the cloud in terms of its possibilities to improve 
mapping and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) analyses. For instance, Michael Goodchild 
is often cited for praising ‘Web 2.0’ for the social networks and public participation cultures it 
creates. Likewise, Michael Peterson (2015) speaks to the possibilities that the cloud presents for 
cartographers to expand their reach with both analysis and communication through mapping. 
Unfortunately, no connection to social media or its infrastructure is referenced in this literature 
either. As such, we can see that the holes in geographic research on social media and its physical 
location are large and begging to be filled. That being said, literature from FWPE, UPE, and 
scholarship on the ‘New West’ provide a helpful framework from which one can begin to 
construct a geography of data centers. 
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First-World Urban Political Ecology Framework 
Taken as a whole, geography and media studies are both beginning to grasp the importance of 
studying the socio-environmental impacts of social media and the cloud. Although this research 
is neither unified nor physically grounded in empirical research, it is encouraging that various 
scholars have begun to examine the real spaces and places in which the cloud and social media 
come to life (e.g. Hogan 2013, 2015; Mahmoudi and Levenda 2016; Pickren 2016). Despite the 
fact that political ecologists (urban or otherwise) have yet to engage with the topic, the specific 
framework that best aligns with my research is a (modified) political ecology approach. Blaikie 
and Brookfield (1987, p.17) famously defined political ecology as encompassing “the constantly 
shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups 
within society itself.” However, political ecology has largely focused on marginalized rural 
communities in the third world, ignoring both the city and the first world as viable regions of 
study (Heynen 2014; Angelo and Watchsmuth 2015). Hence, the charge has been made against 
political ecologists to move into different places and spaces, leading to the more recent 
development of First-world Political Ecology (FWPE) and Urban Political Ecology (UPE). Both 
sub-fields contribute to the basis of my research. 
Critical of political ecology’s almost exclusive focus on local-scale case studies of 
resource conflicts in rural Third-World communities, UPE and FWPE are becoming increasingly 
important in defining contemporary political ecology research. The FWPE discourse asks us to 
question the perceived First-Third World divide because in reality, the two are not as different as 
we might imagine. As James McCarthy (2002, p. 1297) suggests, the problems caused by 
capitalism in the first world “have at least as much causal power in contemporary ecological and 
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political economic dynamics as the struggles of agrarian peasant societies.” One of the most 
valuable insights FWPE brings to light then, is the fact that the distinctions we make between 
different geographies of the world are becoming increasingly irrelevant, especially considering 
the growing digital network that spans across the earth (Castells 2010). Likewise, Peter Walker 
(2003, p. 8) argues, “the dismantling of the first and third worlds as geographic frames could be 
seen as promoting a kind of globalized political ecology project,” a project that would allow 
political ecologists to escape the ‘micro-politics’ mode of analysis they currently employ. To 
holistically understand a conflict (rural, urban, or otherwise), scholars must examine issues 
through multi-scalar lenses, seeking connections between local, regional, national, and 
international scales (McCarthy 2002; Wainwright 2005). FWPE is a step in the right direction. 
Similar to FWPE, UPE has served to broaden the scope of political ecology. The sub-
field developed in response to the perceived lack of engagement with urban affairs by political 
ecologists. Scholars suggest that the primary reason political ecology research remained in the 
countryside rather than urban areas was because the field mainly asked questions of politics in 
relation to environmental degradation and rehabilitation. These were not, at first, explicitly urban 
matters (Braun 2005; Wachsmuth 2012). Nonetheless, a new field emerged in the 1990s, 
stressing the importance of examining urban spaces in geographic research. Initial UPE research 
could be condensed into studies of water flows (e.g. Smith 2001; Swyngedouw 2004; Kaika 
2005), and of metabolic processes of diverse forms (e.g. Véron 2006; Heynen 2006; Evans 
2007). Building on these crucial initial works, more recent scholarship has taken dialectical 
thinking about urban space to new levels. For instance, some have focused on the production of 
socio-environmental norms and cohesion (e.g. Bunce and Desfor 2007; Cook and Swyngedouw 
2012), while others have examined political economy in relation to sustainability and 
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environmental justice (Aylett 2010) or neoliberal resource regimes (Heynen et al. 2007). Still 
others have begun to expand research into urban infrastructure (Monstad 2009) and ecological 
security in urban spaces (Hodson and Marvin 2009). Evidently, the subfield has become vast, 
and it is only getting larger and more varied. My research will only further expand its scope. 
Throughout this seemingly disparate work, two particularly noteworthy and 
interconnected concepts have guided UPE: metabolism and circulation (Heynen et al. 2006). 
Metabolism, a concept borrowed from Marx, suggests that nature and society are constantly 
interchanging with one another, and the specific ‘social metabolic order’ of this interchange is 
created through different modes of production (Foster et al. 2010, p. 75). The circulation concept 
shows how accumulation, growth, and change occur as capital circulates money and 
commodities (Swyngedouw 2006). UPE scholars recognize that these processes work in tandem 
to socially produce nature in such a way that nature appears external to our existence (especially 
in the city), even though the dualisms constructed between nature and society are entirely false. 
As Smith (2006, p. xiii) states, “The notion of metabolism set up the circulation of matter, value 
and representations is the vortex of social nature.” The conception of a socially produced, 
externalized nature is infinitely useful in that it can be used to explain human and environmental 
destruction in the hands of capitalists, inside the city and out. These ideas are key for 
understanding the social and environmental changes that occur in neighboring communities as a 
result of data center construction. 
Despite having these instructive and uniting concepts, some scholars have criticized UPE 
scholarship for its ‘methodological cityism.’ That is to say, the city stubbornly remains urban 
political ecologists’ main place of research, despite the fact that the urban social transformation 
processes they are studying extend beyond city borders (Angelo and Wachsmuth 2015). In short, 
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UPE has forgotten to address the city-country dualism that gave rise to the nature-society divide 
they so fervently oppose in the first place. As Bruce Braun (2005,    p. 647) states in his critique: 
We [urban political ecologists] may have brought ‘nature’ into the city, but we 
may still be some way from truly grasping the transitivity, porosity and rhythms 
of these multiscalar ‘machinic assemblages’ that give urban life its potential and 
its risks. 
 
William Cronon’s (1991) book, Nature’s Metropolis, serves as an excellent example of a 
way to discuss the rural-urban divide in relation to the nature-society divide. Cronon, although 
not a political ecologist himself, describes how the hinterland surrounding Chicago was 
necessary for the city’s uprising and survival thereafter. He documents the continuous flow of 
natural resources and commodities that transformed both rural and urban spaces simultaneously, 
albeit without discussing the social production of nature and/or the power and class struggles 
involved (Wachsmuth 2012). Research that merged UPE and Cronon’s work would thus 
represent the best of both worlds; or, at least it would eliminate the contradiction between the 
‘planetary’ scale of urbanization accepted by UPE scholars and the fact that their analyses 
remain in cities alone. 
So, how should UPE expand its reach? Joshua Newell and Joshua Cousins (2015, p.721) 
suggest that the subfield must develop a ‘political-industrial ecology,’ which fuses industrial 
ecology and urban ecology to create a new metaphor of “metabolism of the urban ecosystem…a 
global circulatory process of socio-natural relations that transforms and (re)creates urban 
ecosystems through the exchange of resources, capital, humans, and non-humans into and out of 
the spaces of global urbanization.” Newell and Cousins claim that this new metaphor is an 
important step in moving UPE beyond ‘cityism.’ Matt Huber (2017) builds on this idea with his 
portrayal of nitrogen fertilizer plants as a ‘hidden abode of production.’ Huber contends that 
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political ecologists must politicize the industrial ecologies that support the urban way of life, 
particularly those located outside of city borders. Accordingly, my thesis research demonstrates 
the validity of these critics’ claims regarding the importance of First-World political industrial 
ecology. Using the concepts of metabolism and the nature-society/rural-urban divides as a 
backdrop, my work offers a case study of a small rural town in the Western United States that 
has challenged such divisions since it was founded. FWPE and UPE (or UFWPE, as it may be 
called) thus lays the foundation of my analyses of Prineville, Oregon and its new data centers. 
Still, questions remain about the specific geographic and cultural setting in which Prineville 
exists that cannot be addressed using a UFWPE framework alone. Consequently, I also find 
myself amidst a debate that began in the 1990s about the American West as a whole. More 
specifically, I situate myself within the scholarship surrounding a so-called ‘New West.’ 
 
The New West Scholarship 
Considering the accusations of FWPE scholars, it is not surprising that the rural American West 
has only somewhat recently begun to gain political ecologists’ attention (e.g. Robbins 1996). The 
concept of a ‘New West’ emerged in the early 1990s, around the same time that UPE began to 
gain a footing among geographers. Although the idea was hinted at prior to William Robbins’ 
(1996) piece in Montana: The Magazine of Western History, his words seem to best solidify the 
concept. Robbins’ (1996) work explained a curious emergent phenomenon in the rural American 
West: the extractive industries of the ‘Old West’ were being replaced by service-sector industries 
characteristic of a globalized capitalism. Robbins described how the “once decaying and sleepy 
cattle and mining towns” of the West were becoming “bustling, upscale commercial and 
recreative centers for refugees from elsewhere” (p. 70). In other words, new forms of capital 
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were taking over the West as unprecedented population growth occurred, reshaping the culture of 
small rural towns in particular. Robbins (1996) also noted the fact that this new capital was 
beginning to exacerbate economic inequalities and promote uneven development in the region. 
This unevenness has since grown in the West and is still evident in many communities today. 
  In the years since Robbins’ (1996) essay, the body of literature surrounding the New 
West concept has quickly grown. For example, William Riebsame and colleagues (1997) created 
an Atlas of the New West, which contains colorful maps and detailed statistics that support 
Robbins’ conclusions. Their work makes it clear that the West was, at the time, a region 
experiencing exciting and accelerating cultural, economic, and political changes. In the 
introduction to the atlas, the authors aptly state that the New West “is the archetypal case of an 
American region yanked from its historical and myth-based sense of place into hyper-
development and plugged-in modernity.” In agreement, ten years later, a study published in 
Rural Sociology on the Inter-Mountain region of the West confirmed that a New West had 
indeed emerged as ‘outsiders’ had immigrated and generated cultural change in the area 
(Winkler et al. 2007). Scholars thus began to set up a divisive distinction between the Old West’s 
cowboys, ranchers, and farmers and the New West’s Patagonia-wearing, Starbucks-drinking 
younger generation in search of outdoor leisurely activities on their days off from high-tech jobs 
in the city (Reisbame et al. 1997; Taylor 2004; Winkler et al. 2007). As a whole, this literature 
seems to have come to the conclusion that the rural American West has been completely 
transformed into a new and different place, one focused on what natural amenities and recreation 
resources it has to offer, rather than the traditional resource extraction industry that once 
attracted workers to the area.  
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In lieu of documenting these cultural, social, and environmental changes, scholars have 
examined the notion that ‘rural gentrification’ is occurring in the West. Similar to the urban 
gentrification geographers have thoroughly discussed, the term ‘rural gentrification’ is used to 
explain the process of people leaving the city for the countryside and remaking it as their own as 
they remove and replace those who originally resided there (Taylor 2004; Travis 2007; Bryson 
2010). This in-migration of urbanites and suburanites is allegedly the cause of the shifts in the 
ways Western citizens have viewed and valued nature (e.g. Bryson 2010; Bryson and Wyckoff 
2010). As cultural changes have occurred, western land became more valuable in terms of 
amenity uses and less valuable in terms of productive uses (Travis 2007, p. 176). Scholars have 
thus married ideas from UPE, FWPE, and the New West discourse by documenting the 
transformation of the rural Western United States from a landscape of production to one of 
consumption. Furthermore, it is clear that this rural gentrification has exacerbated the apparently 
inherent unevenness of the West, as certain areas within the region have been deemed more 
valuable than others because of their geographic proximity to natural amenities (Taylor 2004; 
Bryson 2012). Arguably, this uneven development is evident in that many small rural towns 
across the region have deteriorated while others have soared ahead in an economic boom thanks 
to tourism and other service-sector industries. Themes of unevenness, rural development, and 
attracting businesses and people to specific areas are important for the analyses of data centers in 
Prineville that I present in the next few chapters. 
It is worth noting first however, that despite its widespread use, the New West idea is not 
without its critics. Some scholars contend that there is arguably nothing unique about the 
phenomenon occurring in the West. For instance, Taylor (2004) describes how similar trends in 
economic development are occurring globally, and therefore this ‘boosterism’ about the West is 
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unfounded. Moreover, as Winkler and colleagues (2007) indicate, cultural transformations have 
been concentrated only in rural towns that happened to be amenity-rich. That is to say, towns that 
are not lucky enough to be located near mountains or national parks and recreation resources 
have a hard time attracting those in favor of the New West way of life. As such, the social, 
cultural, and environmental changes occurring in the West are not all-encompassing. 
Furthermore, Robbins (1999) himself states,  “the special conditions and circumstances shaping 
the landscapes of the modem American West are remarkably similar to influences that directed 
the course of change in the region during the previous century.” It would thus seem that there is 
nothing new about change in the West. Accordingly, though not a critic of the New West idea, 
Travis (2007) points out that it is entirely unclear when the ‘new’ part of the New West emerged 
because the American West has experienced cycles of ‘boom and bust’ for hundreds of years. 
Again, the fact that socio-cultural transformations are taking place is apparently not unforeseen 
for this region. It is also more than likely that changes will continue as diversity increases with 
in-migration of people from various regions of the world (Reisbame et al. 1997). In contrast, 
more recently, other scholars have suggested that the dualism presented between the old and new 
has outright disappeared, since components of both lifestyles now appear to coexist in many 
regions (Duane 2012; Jenkins 2016). As such, perhaps the West is now experiencing a 
transformation that may ultimately result in yet another ‘New’ West. Cloud infrastructure is at 
the forefront of these recent developments. 
Clearly, although scholarship on the New West is rich with insights about the shift from 
extractive industries to service industries, their conversation has become somewhat outdated. 
That is to say, scholars have failed to examine the role that technological infrastructure 
specifically, such as data centers, may play in shaping what has been deemed the ‘Next West’ 
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(Duane 2012). In this latest version of the American West, there is now “an uneven landscape 
where both old and new persist as archipelagos in a sea of one another” (Jenkins 2016, p. 184), 
which has been fostered by the technological development across the region. If this is true, social 
media and related technology have created networks not only of information, but also of 
infrastructure that blur the line between rural and urban spaces. This blurring suggests that while 
seemingly at odds with one another, the West is now able to host both the old and the new 
together, as landscapes of consumption and production are mixed. This occurrence clearly merits 
the attention of political ecologists and geographers more broadly, and yet they have failed 
speculate what it might mean for the rural American West.  
 
A Geography of Data Centers 
Journalists and media scholars have begun to document the ways in which technological 
infrastructure can reshape the world, but they are lacking a concreteness in their analyses. They 
do not speak to where or why in particular this reshaping occurs, or to whom it matters. UPE, 
FWPE, and the New West discourse also have not addressed the real-world impacts of 
technology infrastructure and social media. The key insight from reviewing this literature is that 
together, they challenge the separation between rural and urban spaces because every natural 
resource and human community are a part of a larger global system at work. The metabolism of 
nature by the industrial infrastructure of data centers maintains and supports the virtual world 
with which more and more people engage globally. Data centers connect us in a network that 
ignores any physical geographical distinctions between the city and countryside. And yet, many 
of these buildings exist in rural areas across the U.S., and everyone, regardless of where they 
live, is still shielded from understanding the real-world impacts of growing data consumption. As 
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the immense ecological ‘footprint’ of the information technology (IT) industry and data centers 
shows, the virtual world ultimately has big consequences for the real world. It is crucial that 
research is conducted on the transformations of place and space occurring as a result of 
consumption, production, and storage of data. Speaking in abstract terms about flows of 
information and power across space is simply not enough. As Graham Pickren (2017, n.p.) points 
out, we must think about “computing and big data as physical and historical phenomena… to 
contextualize the rapid social and technological change taking place within space and time, 
rather than viewing this shift as a movement towards a kind of inevitable end state.” In essence, 
to combat any negative social, cultural, and environmental impacts our technology fetish has 
brought, geographers must conduct research and covey their results in a concrete manner that is 
meaningful to people in the real world. 
Numerous data centers have been built by various data storage companies in areas that 
differ both geographically and culturally, especially in the United States (Figure 4). Hyper-scale 
data centers, however, are a more recent trend that has brought these high-tech buildings beyond 
city borders (Pickren 2016). But how do big data companies choose where to locate, since the 
physical locations of data centers are so widely dispersed? Based on Facebook and Apple’s 
choices thus far, it appears that the most desirable locations will provide the companies with 
cheap land, low-cost and abundant power, access to water, tax breaks, and increasingly, the 
ability to invest in renewable sources of energy to power their data centers (Hogan 2013; Pickren 
2016).  These uniting characteristics show how big data companies are certainly interested in 
growing their business worldwide, but are also gradually becoming invested in ‘greener’ forms 
of capitalism (Data Center Knowledge 2010). 
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Figure 4. Locations of data centers in the United States. Dot sizes represent the number of data 
centers per state. These data do not include the new hyper-scale data centers built or under 
construction within the last three years. Map by author, data obtained from Data Center Map, 
http://www.datacentermap.com/. 
 
In the chapters that follow, I examine the case of Prineville, Oregon with UFWPE and the 
New West discourse as a backdrop. Prineville, a small rural town in the Western U.S., is similar 
to many towns that have been included under the umbrella of the New West paradigm. It was 
once a booming timber town that quickly began to die out. Yet, unlike what New West 
scholarship would predict, Prineville turned to something other than tourism and outdoor 
recreation for survival: data centers. The town has been adopted (or coopted?) by technology and 
social media companies, and now, like neighboring Western towns, it is undergoing social, 
cultural, and environmental change. However, the crucial question is, what sort of change, and 
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how much? The goal of my thesis research is to ‘catch the cloud’ and bring it down to the earth, 
where the impact of our technophilia can be seen playing out on the socio-environmental 
landscape of the rural American West. This is where questions of the nature of technological 
development can be answered at a level that matters to real-world communities. It is here, in 
places like Prineville, where we can begin to construct a geography of data centers. 
 
Notes 
1. “Beneath the Cloud: Exploring what the internet is made of,” TheAtlantic.com, last 
modified January 8, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/projects/beneath-the-cloud/. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
REBOOTING A TOWN: VISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
 
To understand the decisions Prineville has made in the last decade, it is important to understand 
the story of a neighboring town: Bend. Bend is the classic example of what scholars would deem 
a stereotypical ‘New West’ town. Before coming to Oregon, I had read other scholars’ work on 
Bend (e.g. Rothman 1998; Robbins 2004; Jackson and Kulkhen 2006) and learned how city 
transformed physically and culturally in recent years, which made me curious to see the 
differences between Prineville and the booming city nearby. So, on yet another swelteringly hot 
afternoon during my time in Central Oregon, I decided I should see Bend in person. Leaving 
behind the agricultural fields and ranches on the outskirts of Prineville, I felt oddly as if I had left 
Oregon suddenly and been transported back to my suburban town in New York. The first thing I 
saw when I approached Bend was a shopping mall. The plaza I passed by housed of all the 
standard commercial chains one would expect to find in any other small ‘modern’ city in the 
United States. I could use some new running shoes, I thought as I stopped at a traffic light near 
Dick’s Sporting Goods. I shook my head in disbelief at the thought. Yesterday I was at a 
farmer’s market in Pioneer Park speaking with ex-mill workers, and today I was stuck in a line of 
traffic thinking about buying shoes. I supposed this sort of jarring juxtaposition was precisely 
what New West scholars had been talking about. The difference between Prineville and Bend 
seemed to manifest the features of a transforming New West: Bend had become a busy city, full 
of noisy tourists, retail stores, and trendy coffee shops. I drove toward downtown, curious to see 
what other New West characteristics would come to fruition. 
I was not disappointed. The center of Bend hosts a larger shopping center called the Old 
Mill District (Figure 5). Passing through at least ten traffic circles—and nearly getting lost 
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twice—I finally found a spot to park the truck. I got out and walked toward the center of the 
District. I was greeted by a building with three shiny smokestacks that towered over the mall. 
Here was the epitome of New West transformation: the old mill at the center of Bend had 
become an REI store, full of high-quality gear for the would-be hikers, kayakers, and mountain 
bikers passing through.  
 
 
Figure 5. The Old Mill District in Bend, Oregon. The smokestacks, once part of a 
sawmill operation, are now decorations atop an REI store. In the distance, high-rise 
luxury apartments are also visible, an increasingly common sight around the growing 
city. Source: Jennyfurniss (Jenny Furniss) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons. 
 
Looking around at the surrounding stores and restaurants, more of the New West 
generalizations I had read about came to life. There were upscale houses surrounding the 
District, and brewpubs, salons, and other high-end retail stores were all within walking distance. 
Sitting in Farewell Bend Park later that afternoon (Figure 6), I saw people lounging on the grass 
or jogging, despite the oppressive 90-degree heat. Kayakers, standup paddle boarders, and river 
floaters coasted by on the steady, cool current of the Deschutes River. Everyone looked like they 
were having fun. Even still, something felt very forced about it. Bend seemed like a city-size 
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vacation resort. I couldn’t help but think that the city embraces a kind of ephemeral bliss, a thin 
film covering the (literal) dirt of its past. 
 
 
Figure 6. The Deschutes River running past a recreation 
trail in Farewell Bend Park in Bend, Oregon. Note the 
omnipresent luxury housing overlooking the park. Photo 
by author. 
 
Bend and Prineville may seem worlds apart today but they had similar beginnings. In this 
chapter I explore how and why these towns have developed the way that they have, focusing on 
Prineville in particular, as well as what their development means for New West scholarship. The 
comparison between the two cities helps problematize the simplicity of the New West 
conception. According to New West logic (e.g. Reisbame et al. 1997; Rothman 1998), Prineville 
should have either become a busy tourist-filled city, as the town developed its economy to fit 
within the reshaped mold of modern capitalism like Bend—or else completely stagnate. 
However, I argue that Prineville has struck a peculiar balance between the New and Old West. 
As such, the town’s development raises a number of questions: What type of economy is 
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Prineville, if not Old or New? Does its development indicate that the New West ideas are no 
longer applicable in this digital age? After providing a brief history of Bend, Prineville, and 
Central Oregon more broadly, I will address these questions and conclude with some thoughts 
about the broader implications of Prineville’s story. 
 
From Timber to Tourism or Tech 
Oregon, once the ultimate journey’s end, “is central to some of the deepest and most fiercely 
held narratives of American frontier history” (Cronon 1997, p. xi). As such, the landscape here 
embodies the historic romanticism about the pristine nature of the Western Frontier. Oregon’s 
story begins much like other states’ stories in the Pacific Northwest by dispossessing Native 
peoples of their land and a swift transition into a landscape rife with pioneer yeoman farmers—
and over time, with bureaucratic institutions and large corporations (Robbins 2004, p. xvii-xxi). 
Nonetheless, Oregon is distinctive because it is here that tensions are visible between the desire 
to live out the dreams of agrarian community and progress and the reality of this region’s 
historical environment (Cronon 1997). The landscape of Oregon provided great hope and 
promise to pioneers long ago for its vast stores of environmental resources, but what happens to 
it now in the digital age is becoming increasingly uncertain. 
Central Oregon in particular is worth examining because it is both literally and 
metaphorically central to the state. It is optimally located for resource extraction and movement 
of goods to the larger cities in Oregon, though it is certainly not its sole resource supplier 
(Pedersen 2016). The area consists of three primary counties including Deschutes, Crook, and 
Jefferson County. These three counties cover 7,833 square miles, and are surrounded by the 
Cascades, the Blue Mountains, and the Columbia River Plateau. Although Central Oregon has an 
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arid climate, several important water bodies flow through its cities and towns (Orr and Orr 
2006). The Deschutes River is the primary water source, which flows to the Columbia River and 
also branches into the Metolius River and the Crooked River further south (Figure 7). History 
has proven this geographic location to be both strategic and problematic (Jackson and Kulkhen 
2006). 
 
 
Figure 7. Map of Central Oregon. Modified from Alexrk2 via Wikimedia Commons. 
 
Central Oregon is situated such that it lends itself to both resource extraction and to 
enjoyment of the landscape’s natural amenities. For this reason, Central Oregon originated as a 
hub of mining, ranching, agriculture, and forestry (Jackson and Kulken 2006, p. 171-177). The 
economy of the region’s towns and cities centered on these extractive industries, making them an 
Crook 
Deschutes 
Jefferson 
Metolious 
River 
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important part of capitalism’s worldwide expansion (Robbins 1997). However, before towns 
could build up around these industries in the early 1900s, people had to be able to get there—and 
they had to want to stay there. As such, the railroads were crucial to the economic and cultural 
development of Central Oregon from their advent. Transporting goods between rural and urban 
spaces was essential if small towns wanted to survive in the high desert (Jackson and Kuhlken 
2006, p. 176). The need for mobility shaped Central Oregon’s history and its natural landscape. 
Transportation infrastructure primarily maintained these towns as an important part of the 
nation’s development as a whole for many years (Olson 2012). The Second World War 
transformed much of the American West, Central Oregon included, which was made possible at 
least in part by the railways constructed a half-century before. Oregon’s physical and cultural 
landscape was largely restructured by economic forces after 1945, especially as the nation’s 
desires shifted toward consumerism, in conjunction with the rise of the automobile industry and 
an increase in the number of affluent middle-class citizens (Robbins 2004). The American West 
was “in perpetual motion” after WWII, “operating at a frenzied pitch for more than three 
decades” (Robbins 2004, p.17). As such, the extractive industries experienced accelerated 
growth and activity, sending Central Oregon into a boom of economic prosperity.  
Despite this mid-century prosperity, however, conflicts began to emerge (Robbins 2004). 
The desire to remain an integral part of the global capitalistic market—and provide for the WWII 
effort—started to deplete Oregon’s natural resources, as “early comers and their successor 
generations plowed the soil, hewed the timber, and fished the region’s streams with neither 
caution, introspection, nor reflection” (Robbins 2004, p. xvii). Accordingly, with the rising 
national concern for environmental health and subsequent federal regulation in the 1960s and 
1970s, Central Oregon’s extractive industries were suddenly seen in a less positive light, and 
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their productivity decreased gradually (Robbins 2005). Oregon in 1980s and 1990s was thus 
characterized by a decline in the once-booming extractive industries, in part because 
environmental groups worked to limit their activity in the name of conservation (Robbins 2004). 
Moreover, increasing automation within agriculture and timber industries between 1950 and 
2000 led to fewer available jobs (Robbins 2005, p. 144). This trend has also continued into the 
twenty-first century, leading to economic decline in many regions of the rural American West. 
As New West scholarship indicates, with the loss of traditional livelihoods, the region began a 
rapid transformation into a completely different landscape (e.g. Reisbame et al. 1997). Parts of 
the West soon became a place for the enjoyment of natural amenities, reliant on service-sector 
jobs for its economic base rather than extractive industries. 
Before discussing the implications of such a transition, it is worth mentioning the key 
role of technology in driving these economic changes. As previously noted, Central Oregon has 
been historically reliant upon technological innovation to sustain its existence (e.g. railroads, 
telephone lines, water infrastructure etc.), and arguably it still must be due to its geographic 
location. Consequently, the region was long ago described as a “western zone of experiment” by 
Isaiah Bowman (1931, p. 93). In Bowman’s view, the combination between old and new 
technologies and rural and urban spaces produced extremes of both wealth and poverty. As a 
result, traditional ways of life and values were promoted simultaneously with modern ones in 
Central Oregon (Olson 2012). This strange combination of old and new is still visible in the 
landscape of the rural West. The place where Bowman’s ‘zone of experiment’ is currently 
coming to life is Prineville, Oregon. 
The city of Prineville has relied upon technological innovation since it was founded in 
1868 (Juris 2017). Prineville sits nestled in the Crooked River/Ochoco Creek valley, essentially a 
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human-made oasis in the desert (Figure 8). By 1880, Prineville became a busy frontier town of 
200 people that worked to provide goods and materials to those living in Central Oregon (Juris 
2017). Unfortunately however, the city was left behind when railroad companies neglected to 
connect Prineville to the main railways due to geographic constraints (Juris 2017).  
 
Figure 8. Map of Prineville, Oregon. The data centers are marked by stars. Map by 
author. 
 
 
In spite of these companies’ neglect, Prineville began building its own rail line in 1917, 
and with the help of newly constructed roads, the town remained an important part in the state’s 
economy (Mills 1941). The Prineville City Railway still runs today, but the booming town of the 
past has changed immensely in recent years (Figure 9). Prineville’s story largely reflects the 
same pattern of decline as the American West overall, yet it is unique in a few regards. As 
geographers Philip Jackson and Robert Kuhlken (2006, p. 176) put it, “Economically, Prineville 
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has always been both lucky and somewhat stubborn.” As I explain, rather than following the path 
set forth by surrounding New West communities, Prineville has chosen its own new path. 
 
 
Figure 9. A railcar on the train tracks outside of downtown Prineville, 
Oregon, not currently in use. Photo by author. 
 
In the early years of its development, Prineville became a quintessential timber town, 
harvesting timber from nearby Ochoco National Forest and home to seven mills in constant 
motion (Jackson and Kuhlken 2006, p.176). These mills supported the town’s economy for many 
decades, but there was more prosperity to come. In 1952, one of the largest sustaining industries 
in Prineville was founded by a man born-and-raised in Central Oregon: Les Schwab. He created 
a company called Les Schwab Tire Centers, which has also helped maintain Prineville’s 
economy since its establishment, as it employed the largest proportion of the town’s residents not 
working in the mills (Figure 10). Today, the company handles over one billion dollars in annual 
sales, and has expanded operation to seven different states (Bates 1997). Les Schwab’s is also 
still one of the major employers in Prineville and the wider Central Oregon region (City of 
Prineville 2016). Nonetheless, just as in other neighboring cities, as logging depleted the forests 
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and sustained yield laws in the late twentieth century made Prineville’s economy slide sharply 
downhill. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Les Schwab Tire Center, located on NW 3rd Street in 
Prineville, Oregon. Les Schwab’s remains one of the largest 
employers in the area, and has expanded its operations 
significantly since its foundation in 1952. The company has helped 
maintain Prineville’s economic vitality through difficult times. 
 
Perhaps at least partly due to its ‘stubborn’ nature, Prineville was able to survive through 
to the early 2000s, relying upon Les Schwab Tire Centers and a dwindling number of timber and 
construction jobs to support its local economy (Juris 2017). The town’s economic situation 
became dismal according to local officials, however, in 2007-2009 as they felt the widespread 
effects of the national recession and housing bubble. Much to the locals’ dismay, Prineville’s 
unemployment rate reached twenty-one percent in 2008 (City of Prineville 2017). To make 
matters worse, historically, Prineville’s in-migration has outpaced its job growth, but during the 
recession the town actually lost more people than it gained for the first time (EDCO 2017). As 
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such, local officials knew when they hit this all-time-low that they must begin searching in 
earnest for something to keep their community alive. 
Taking a step back from Prineville’s story momentarily, it is important to discuss the 
larger factors at play in the changes taking place in the American West. Namely, there seems to 
be a broad consensus that the best way for rural towns in the American West to survive in our 
capitalism-centered world is through economic growth and development (e.g. Robbins 1996). 
David Harvey’s (1989) concept of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ helps explain what has been 
happening recently in Prineville, as well as in Central Oregon overall. Harvey (1989) describes 
how, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, cities started to take an entrepreneurial approach to 
urban governance rather than a managerial one. In other words, in response to globalization, 
mobile capital, and subsequent increased urban competition, Harvey (1989, p. 5) notes how local 
officials in cities began “doing the best they [could] to maximise the attractiveness of the local 
site as a lure for capitalist development.” In essence, to survive in the global economy, cities 
have realized that they must make themselves attractive to big businesses and modern industries. 
Harvey (1989) outlines four strategies for urban entrepreneurialism: (1) use natural advantages 
(e.g. geographic location or resource base) for the production of goods and services, (2) attract 
consumerism by highlighting the local quality of life, (3) make infrastructural investments and 
improvements, and (4) redistribute surpluses to higher levels of state control. These strategies 
may be mixed by local leaders to achieve said ‘attractiveness.’ Arguably, the small cities and 
towns of Western rural America are undergoing a similar transition. 
As the New West scholarship indicates, when the extractive industries that once sustained 
small cities like Prineville declined, a transition to a service-based economy began (Reisbame et 
al. 1997; Taylor 2004; Robbins 2005). During this transition, rural places effectively needed to 
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establish a stronger, more viable economic base to survive in competition with their urban 
counterparts (Robbins 1997). So, based on the economic transformations visible in the West, 
approaches to entrepreneurialism used by urban cities have been applied by rural ones. In the 
face of global capitalism and technological innovation, rural towns in the American West were 
left with few options other than to conform to a new sort of economy. As I will discuss, one 
option, tourism, can lead to transformations that may reverse a community’s character forever. 
Another (more recent) option, data center construction, may or may not do the same. 
As a result of these limited options, Harvey’s (1989) ideas about entrepreneurialism can 
thus be seen playing out in Central Oregon, albeit in varying, localized ways. For example, 
Prineville was not the only city that had to seek a new, stronger economic base. Bend, thirty-six 
miles southwest of Prineville, has a parallel story. However, although Bend and Prineville had 
similar experiences of economic development and decline initially, the two cities have had vastly 
dissimilar experiences in re-development since the turn of the century. The reason for the 
differing outcomes of this process is a result of a combination of factors; however, the most 
direct cause is likely the industries each city attracted when it came time to rethink their 
economic bases. Whereas the officials in Prineville chose the technology industry to rebuild their 
little town, Bend made what Hal Rothman (1998) calls a ‘devil’s bargain’: an economy based on 
tourism and outdoor recreation. 
 
What the Devil Did Bend Do? 
Bend, like Prineville, was once a bustling timber town (Robbins 2004). When that industry 
declined, the city began to rely on the natural amenities of Deschutes County to support its 
economy (Olson 2012). In short, Bend became a tourist town. Unfortunately for long-term 
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residents, this shift to tourism and outdoor recreation came at a great cost. As Rothman (1998, p. 
10) states, “Tourism is a devil’s bargain…Regions, communities, and locales welcome tourism 
as an economic boon, only to find that it irrevocably changes them in unanticipated and 
uncontrollable ways.” That is to say, as tourists are welcomed into a given community, they tend 
to bring with them a new way of life and certain characteristics and values that may be at odds 
with a region’s preexisting one. As the concept of ‘rural gentrification’ suggests, locals are 
slowly pushed out by the increasing inequality of wealth and the redistribution of power 
(Rothman 1998; Bryson 2010). There then follows a progression of ‘colonialism,’ both external 
because new people are coming in and taking over the physical town, and internal because, “as 
the industry reflects to visitors more of what they want it to be, it changes the people of those 
[towns] even more” (Rothman 1998, p. 370). As such, the seemingly benign tourism industry 
becomes a domineering power over the places and people that adopt it. Ironically, the very thing 
a community believes will save their town or city can end up destroying their cherished cultural 
identity and/or sense of place as a result. 
In Central Oregon more specifically, Robbins (2005) discusses how incoming tourists 
have marginalized locals and their traditional livelihoods, in part due to increases in rental prices, 
property taxes, and real estate prices. Bend and other cities of the American West have been 
gentrified into playgrounds for affluent newcomers (Bryson 2010). Tourists and retirees can 
escape into the mountains for a few days, then return home to gated communities, golf courses, 
trendy boutiques, and upscale cafes. Consequently, there is more traffic and noise. The long-term 
residents have become the bus drivers, waiters, janitors, and other service workers that keep the 
city going instead of mill workers or farmers (Robbins 2005, p. 200). And yet the city in which 
these people now reside is no longer recognizable as theirs. The uniqueness of a local culture 
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dissolves under the pressure of the newcomers that import their own values and customs to this 
space (Rothman 1998). The result is a growing class division between the wealthy visitors and 
the local service workers (Putman 2015, p. 47).  
Accordingly, Bend is no longer recognizable as the resource-dependent city it once was. 
Due to their new economic strategy, Deschutes County has experienced the most rapid growth in 
all of Central Oregon since the 1990s (Putman 2015, p.46). With this influx of people from 
elsewhere, Bend has become “a frustrating case of the good, the bad, and the ugly” that has 
“failed to guide the growth that should have been so easily anticipated” (Jackson and Kuhlken 
2006, p.174). The locals who welcomed tourists and their money with welcome arms, have 
suffered culturally as a result of tourism—even if they have prospered economically. The juniper 
trees and desert grasses surrounding large saw mills have given way to trendy shops and 
restaurants in the newly urbanized core, along with sprawling suburbs in the periphery. The city 
is more crowded, surrounded by expensive and expansive modern homes that original 
inhabitants of Bend generally could not hope to afford (Robbins 2005, p. 200). In short, Bend’s 
strategic location in the middle of an outdoor recreation mecca has caused a complete economic 
and cultural transformation in the city. Some argue that this change has represented a turn for the 
worst in Western communities. Bend’s story provides a cautionary tale of what can happen when 
communities make a devil’s bargain. Has Prineville done the same? 
 
Develop or Die? 
Since the 1990s, Bend and Prineville have taken divergent paths in developing their respective 
economies. Even as both cities have become focused on entrepreneurialism and attracting big 
businesses, Prineville’s economy has taken an entirely different shape. Prineville too was once a 
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dying town that needed to reconsider its reliance on traditional extractive industries. Now, as a 
top local official, Beth Robbins, put it, “We [Prineville officials] don’t want all our eggs in one 
basket, and so we’re trying to diversify…We’re open for business. We need it.” Robins is not 
alone in her sentiments. Based on my interviews, it appears that most officials in Prineville have 
grand visions of economic redevelopment for their town. Thinking more broadly, however, it is 
crucial to question what motivates this desire for new development. Seeing what happened to 
Bend as a result of capital (re)development has made some long-term Prineville residents wary 
of such economic endeavors. Almost all my interviewees noted how they, in agreement with 
Rothman’s (1998) ‘devil’s bargain’ idea, saw Bend’s story as a tragedy, rather than a success 
story. Based on Bend’s experience, one might wonder why Prineville would want to redevelop at 
all. As Kirsten Smith, the spokesperson for a local non-profit investment foundation put it, “It’s 
sad what’s happened to Bend. It used to be a nice little timber town, like us, but now you can’t 
go anywhere in town without them building something or fixing the street…it’s just changing so 
fast, and not always for better.”  
 It seems that both Bend and Prineville had little choice in the matter, because whether 
they wanted to change or not, the world around them was. With increasing globalization and 
technological innovation, the town officials saw that they needed to grow the local economy to 
keep up, or else they would be left behind. Rural development has been historically defined as 
any strategy meant to improve the lives of people living in rural areas (Singh 1986), and 
‘improvement,’ according to capitalism, usually means economic and technological growth. 
However, the development of rural places as part of global capitalism and neoliberalism has 
resulted in ‘uneven geographies’ that have not benefitted all communities that undergo 
development (Harvey 2005). In other words, some regions that chose to develop and compete in 
  48 
the global market have won, while others have lost. Consequently, Prineville approaches 
development with caution. The fear that the town could lose its rural Western charm is palpable. 
Local residents certainly can see the parallels between themselves and Bend, and that worries 
many of them. As a town historian Sean Liebers put it bluntly, “I sure hope Prineville is never a 
convoluted mess like Bend.” And yet, officials seemed to realize that to compete, they can no 
longer rely solely on traditional livelihoods from natural resource extraction and agriculture. 
Small rural towns like Prineville and Bend thus necessarily got swept into 
entrepreneurialism as they began attempting to sell their communities as ideal places for 
profitable businesses and nice places to live. Unlike Bend, however, Prineville could not and 
cannot rely on tourism alone. Prineville officials sought other options not only because they are 
not quite near enough to recreation sites for skiing, rafting, and mountain biking. Even an official 
with the Prineville Chamber of Commerce, Cole Kent, said that the growth in Bend had made the 
town lose “some of the attributes that were attracting people to the [Central Oregon] area.” And 
because of their desire to grow, Kent stated, Bend has become “almost its own worst enemy in 
that respect: you can’t go on a bike trail within five miles of Bend without meeting three-hundred 
other people on there.” Evidently, the people of Prineville understand that adopting tourism as 
their only means of economic development would be a detriment to the community culture they 
cherish. In short, the locals simply “don’t want to be the next Bend.” 
 Despite their aversion to Bend, however, with over twenty percent unemployment in 
2008, Prineville was looking at the prospect of becoming a ghost town in a matter of years if 
they did not rethink their economic base. Other neighboring towns, such as Sisters, chose the 
same tourism tactics as Bend, but that simply did not sit well with Prineville residents. Evan 
Kasey, city official, pointed out that “Prineville is located where it is because of natural 
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resources… but unfortunately that [industry] is no longer available.” One would think that with 
such a grim outlook, Prineville’s population would have declined further. Yet those who could 
stay in Prineville through those hard times still stayed. As a long-term local put it, they “loved 
their town and couldn’t imagine leaving it,” regardless of the economic decline.  
Not surprisingly, Prineville pride has become a strong driver of the city’s visions to 
develop economically today. Almost everyone I spoke to in Prineville, official or otherwise, had 
lived there for most of their lives. Many had moved away and come back after going to college. 
There is clearly something about the small town that pulls its residents back in and makes them 
protective of it. As Cole Kent noted, “People that move to our community appreciate its 
character and they want to preserve it.” This sentiment is largely why officials have become 
determined to bring businesses to the area, while at the same time trying to maintain the 
traditional “Prineville way of life.” For instance, Beth Robins emphasized the desire for 
continuing the tradition of housing multi-generational families in Prineville. “Our goal is to be 
able to make families, if they want to stay, stay by choice, and know that they can find a job. 
That hasn’t always been true,” she said adamantly. Town officials have allegedly said all along 
that they needed to “maintain Prineville as Prineville [because] it’s a way of life that a lot of 
people treasure.” Consequently, in the face of economic decline, Prineville officials earnestly 
sought something to save their dying timber town—anything that would prevent them from 
meeting the same fate as Bend. 
 Prineville’s luck changed in late 2009, when a mysterious company using the code name 
“Vitesse” began emailing Prineville officials. Prineville official Pete Stenner stated, “There’s a 
number of communities in central Oregon that we’ve seen struggle, especially after that 
downturn of the economy…You see a little town kind of just go away. [It’s] kind of sad. But 
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we’ve been able to adjust.” This adjustment was largely made possible by the “Vitesse” 
company, which eventually revealed itself as Facebook. The company had chosen Prineville as a 
prospective site for a new data center, and local officials were sure that this was just the thing 
that Prineville needed to turn everything around. Rural entrepreneurialism was at work as town 
officials made Prineville look as desirable as possible through tax cuts and incentive packages, in 
addition to their “transparency, honesty, and work ethic” (City of Prineville 2017)—a common 
tactic cities use to lure businesses (Harvey 1989). As a result, they were able to outcompete other 
rural towns vying for Facebook’s business investments. As Crook County official, Chris Ford, 
put it, Prineville is “a nice place to live. And as we get more amenities, it’ll be a nice place to 
raise your family. I’ve lived here all my life and you look at it differently through time, but right 
now it’s in a boom…I still wonder though, how do we handle or manage the expansion without 
changing what our look might have always been?” Ford’s question was much like my own. 
Thanks to Facebook, Prineville now seems to be on the cusp of what was and what might be. Are 
data centers be the next tourism? Did Prineville make a devil’s bargain too, by signing on with 
Facebook, and later, Apple? 
 
High-Tech and High Time for Reassessment 
On the surface, the answer to the above questions appears to be no. Since Facebook brought the 
data center to Prineville, the city’s unemployment rate dipped to less than six percent. Water and 
electricity infrastructure have been redone, improving service not only to the Facebook data 
center, but also to the entirety of Prineville (Kadel 2017). Moreover, when Facebook moved in, 
Apple soon followed, and $45 million has since been invested in the local economy. The number 
of jobs created is surprisingly high as well, as there have been about three-hundred direct jobs 
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added between the two big data companies—a significant number for a city with a population of 
9,253 people (Kadel 2017). Seventy-five percent of Facebook’s direct employees and fifty 
percent of Apple’s direct employees are also Prineville residents. The deal negotiated by town 
officials was that these workers would also receive 150 percent of minimum wage, which allots 
to an average salary of about $64,000 per year (City of Prineville 2017). As the study by 
ECONorthwest indicates, there is also a ‘job multiplier,’ meaning that for every one data center 
job, two other indirect jobs are created (Wilkerson 2014). More specifically, since this is also an 
ever-expanding industry, indirect jobs such as construction work and security positions are 
continually added. Economically speaking, it is thus clear that Prineville is now fairing much 
better than it was a decade ago. 
 Nonetheless, despite the excitement of local officials from the construction project’s 
outset, Facebook was not necessarily welcomed by all residents. Through my interviews I came 
to understand that there was (and perhaps still is) some resistance among non-officials in the 
town. Many locals were especially concerned about the tax breaks Prineville gave Facebook and 
Apple. The deal negotiated by officials stipulated that Facebook and Apple would receive a 
fifteen year tax abatement on all new property and equipment needed for data center construction 
as part of the Long Term Rural Enterprise Zone (LTREZ) program. LTREZ is a statewide 
program aimed at helping rural areas develop their economies by providing seven- to fifteen-year 
tax abatements to incoming businesses (City of Prineville 2017). What the locals I spoke to 
apparently didn’t realize, is that the requirements to be accepted in the LTREZ program involve 
$11.35 million in capital investments and at least 35 jobs created in the first three years after 
construction. Residents that were concerned about this tax abatement also did not know that 
Facebook and Apple still must pay taxes on the land they purchased (for a total of $6 million) 
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that was already on the Prineville tax rolls (City of Prineville 2017). As such, the town did not 
lose any tax revenue they already brought in, and in a few more years, they will be happily 
accepting millions of dollars annually from both companies as the newly built land is brought 
onto tax rolls. Not to mention the fact that Facebook and Apple had to pay $2 million in 
inspection permits, $1.4 million in franchise fees in fiscal year 2016, and city and county 
payments between $250,000 and $300,000 each year from 2017 onwards (City of Prineville 
2017). Had local residents known these figures, perhaps their opinions of the data centers may 
have been a bit more positive. 
Another common complaint I heard was that these data centers were a menace because 
people perceived that the buildings were using up all the town’s water and energy. I will discuss 
this assumption further in the next chapter, but suffice it to say that another part of the agreement 
Facebook and Apple made with Prineville officials was that they had to invest in improving the 
town’s infrastructure before construction (City of Prineville 2017). As a result, many 
infrastructural improvements have come to fruition over the last seven years, improvements that 
benefit both the data centers and the local residents alike. According to local official, Cole Kent, 
through investments in fiber, power, water wells, roads, and traffic improvements, the companies 
are not only making the town much more attractive to other industries, but they are also making 
local projects possible. “The capital infusion that has come into the community as a result [of the 
data center construction] has made a lot of things possible that wouldn’t have been otherwise,” 
he asserted during our interview. Evidently, the economic benefits of data center construction for 
Prineville are far-reaching and hard to ignore. Prineville official, Evan Kasey, said that numerous 
journalists have come to the area looking for a negative spin on the story, but they have been 
hard-pressed to succeed in finding one. 
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That said, even if the economic improvements seem indisputable, what about the social 
and cultural differences data centers could potentially bring? As discussions of the rural-urban 
‘digital divide’ suggest, urban areas tend to be the epitome of the fast-paced, tech-savvy 
communities, while their rural counterparts lag behind (Hindman 2000, Wilson et al. 2003).  It 
therefore seems odd then that Facebook and Apple would choose to locate in a place like 
Prineville—or any small rural town for that matter. But residents insisted that they were 
technologically savvy and their community had reliable Internet access. A primary official in 
Prineville, Stanley Franklin, said adamantly, “I wouldn’t underestimate the [technological] 
knowledge of the community here…Even in a little rural community like Prineville, we have a 
lot of technologically-advanced systems, not unlike what you would see in an urban area.” Evan 
Kasey and Beth Robins also noted that some of their community members rely upon the Internet 
to obtain the same education and services that urban residents enjoy. As Kasey put it, “When you 
live in eastern Oregon, Amazon Prime kicks ass! I mean, two day shipping when it takes you two 
hours to drive to a store? That is pretty cool.” Prineville has allegedly always had a “strong 
Internet backbone” because cities such as Portland needed to keep in contact with Prineville to 
order and receive raw materials such as timber and tires. Consequently, although it seems the 
high-tech infrastructure is at odds with stereotypically rural places, Prineville no longer fits that 
mold. To be specific, Franklin noted:  
If you go to a high school rodeo tomorrow, and you look around at the parents 
and kids at these rodeos, they’re all on their iPhones, they all have pictures, they 
all have the ability to search for an address, to make calculations, to check the 
weather…these kids are very sophisticated on their phones.  
 
In short, Prineville never lagged behind in terms of digital infrastructure. To town residents, the 
urban-rural digital divide was never a concern. Cowboys, ranchers, farmers, or not, the majority 
of their residents allegedly have cellphones and internet access, and the data centers moving in 
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did nothing to hinder that according to local officials. In fact, if anything, the big data 
companies’ presence improved their connectivity and access. 
Yet even if computer and information-based technology itself is not at odds with the 
Prineville way of life, some residents indicated that they were somewhat worried that big data 
companies could bring larger cultural changes that would rid of their traditional and cherished 
small-town character. If these companies brought in people similar to those that the tourist 
industry in Bend attracts, Prineville could be utterly transformed. As an Economic Development 
for Central Oregon (EDCO) team member in Prineville, Carol Ericson, put it, “We still have a 
few people in our community that will never change their mind no matter how much education 
they have. They have this idea in their heads of how things work, maybe even if that’s not 
reality. Some people just don’t want to see change.” It is hard for long-term residents to imagine 
Prineville any different from the close-knit mining, ranching, and agricultural community it has 
always been until now. Yet when I asked locals to describe changes that have taken place in 
Prineville since Facebook’s arrival, they had trouble coming up with any significant differences 
in the community’s structure. Local official Pete Stenner acknowledged that new workers have 
certainly come to the area, but they aren’t isolated or at odds with long-term residents, “they are 
just part of the fabric.” 
Perhaps the only significant problem cited by officials and townspeople alike was the 
housing shortage in recent years. According to a Crook County official, Chris Ford, “Housing is 
just a growing pain here.” The region has seen an enormous increase in demand for new homes 
in the last two decades, generating a flurry of building activity in the greater central Oregon area 
(Bousquet 2004). However, while data center construction in Prineville has potentially 
exacerbated the problem by bringing new workers to the area, the presence of big data 
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companies is not apparently the root cause. As neighboring cities such as Bend and Redmond 
have seemingly reached a saturation point with new residential construction, people are looking 
for Prineville to become a ‘bedroom community’ because it is located within commuting 
distance and the land costs about half as much (Bousquet 2004). Consequently, new people have 
certainly come to the area, but they are not necessarily from the Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) industry, nor have they caused a significant change to the 
community as a whole. Or at least they haven’t done so yet. More construction is on the way, but 
for now, as Ford put it, “We’re a bedroom community without any bedrooms left.” 
While Prineville officials realize there is a housing problem, they seem unconcerned 
because overall, they have seen nothing but positive outcomes for their community since 
Facebook and Apple first arrived. Cole Kent asserts that the integration of big data companies 
into their economy “has been a game-changer for this little town.” It seems that other locals 
agree for the most part. The majority of residents said they saw increases in hope and prosperity 
of the community since the data centers arrived. Chris Ford affirmed that big data companies 
“really changed what the face of Prineville is today and what it will be.” He thinks the new tech 
industry will “plant a seed that will help us regrow our economy.” Beth Robins indicated that 
while it is true the town simply can’t build houses fast enough to keep up with demand, she 
didn’t see that as a bad thing. Residents come to Prineville because they want to live in a small 
community, and that is what they will continue to get for the time being. Robins assured that 
Prineville “will continue to grow, but not at the speed Bend is growing. In twenty years we will 
probably be 20,000 people, but I think we will retain our small community.”  
For now, Robins appears to be correct. Growth is happening in Prineville, but somehow, 
the town has managed to grow just slowly enough that the community has maintained its small-
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town charm over the last decade. They have not become the next Bend because of these data 
centers—or at least not yet. 
 
From New West to New West 2.0 
Taken as a whole, New West scholars might be intrigued by Prineville’s story. While it is true 
Prineville has transitioned away from its exclusive reliance upon traditional extractive industries, 
farming, and ranching, it still has not transformed into the stereotypical New West city. Of 
course, there are aspects of Prineville that suggest it has at least partially been overcome by 
homogenizing forces, as other American cities have (i.e. they have a Starbucks, DollarTree, and 
McDonald’s), and the town even features a trendy coffee shop and a few brewpubs off of East 
Main Street. And yet there are many other characteristics of Prineville that do not adhere to the 
New West idea at all. To name a few, the town still holds rodeos each week, Pioneer Park hosts 
craft fairs with live country music fairly regularly, and they have parades for every imaginable 
occasion (Figure 11). On the surface, it appears that the original character of Prineville has not 
been lost at all. The precarious marriage of Old and New West characteristics exists in this small 
rural town, and it seems to be working well for them. 
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Figure 11. Performers on stage in Pioneer Park, where live country music is regularly 
enjoyed by local residents. The park also serves as a farmers market a few times a 
month. Photo by author. 
 
 The significance of Prineville’s development to New West scholarship should not be 
overlooked. This story suggests that the points made about the emergent New West are 
increasingly becoming moot. As scholars have already pointed out, the American West has 
always been a landscape of change and forward motion (Taylor 2004). It is a region that could 
likely be classified as ‘new’ with each decade. In its latest technological transformation, many 
Western towns are indeed changing, but these changes cannot be put neatly in the New West 
box. As Prineville’s development over the past decade shows, the experiences of small rural 
Western towns are somewhat place-dependent, or at least more so than New West scholarship 
suggests. While it is true that many places like Bend have made devil’s bargains and have come 
to fit the New West mold, other places like Prineville are trying to hold on to both the Old and 
New together, walking the thin line between two very different worlds. It would thus seem that 
the ‘New West’ term has become outdated—at least for Prineville, and perhaps other Western 
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communities with data centers. I argue that a better way to conceptualize regional transitions in 
the digital age is by thinking of these places as hybrid, in that, as Bowman (1931) indicated long 
ago, modern technology and traditional culture can and do in fact inhabit the same space, mixing 
together despite their apparent contradictions. The American West is always becoming ‘New,’ 
and the current changes the region is experiencing cannot be put into the confines of the 
simplistic model New West scholarship made for it. As such, we are experiencing a transition 
into the New West 2.0, a West that revolves around the ICT industry and its ever-expanding, 
high-speed, interconnected nature. 
 The New West 2.0 label is clearly a play on words, but in all seriousness, it is fitting. The 
entire rural American West can no longer be lumped into a uniform region in transition from 
resource-dependent to tourism mecca. Prineville and other towns that host data centers in the 
future are not like Bend, Oregon, or Aspen, Colorado. Prineville is neither Old nor New, it has 
simply updated to the latest high(er)-tech version of itself, which happens to include data centers. 
The West has been increasingly reliant upon the high-tech industry since the 1980s (Walker and 
Hurley 2011, p. 73), but now these industries are expanding into rural regions. Here they must 
attempt to weave themselves together with once resource-dependent communities. By accepting 
big data companies’ presence, small towns like Prineville are becoming active participants in the 
creation of this new hybridized Old/New West. The community is participating in its own 
reprogramming and redevelopment as they readily allow Facebook and Apple to expand their 
operations on what was once county-owned land and take jobs working for these companies. 
Prineville is thus the beginning of the New West 2.0, a trend that will surely spread to other areas 
of the Pacific Northwest in coming years. 
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 Still, I have only told a small part of Prineville’s story. The New West 2.0 is also 
characterized by physical transformations of the landscape. The cultural shifts seem to be 
minimal as a result of data center construction in Prineville, but what about the physical 
environment? Data centers certainly take up space and use natural resources, but are they any 
worse that tourism industry or any other business? The chapter that follows seeks answers to 
these questions and more, as I attempt to convey the true nature of data centers. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATURE OF DATA CENTERS 
 
 
I stood on the side of the road on the outskirts of Prineville, cell phone in hand. I had stopped the 
truck to take a picture of the scenic mountains in the distance, enjoying how their snowcapped 
peaks provided a stark contrast to the dry dust coating my hiking boots. To my left was the white 
split-rail fence of a small farm, beyond which an enormous sprinkler spewed a thick stream of 
water onto a field of crops (Figure 12). Being an environmentalist, I watched in dismay, not 
understanding how farmers could be so wasteful by watering in at three o’clock in the afternoon. 
I was mesmerized by the rainbows cast above the green plants as the water showered down in the 
sunlight. Standing there, I considered the fact that these people had been farming here for years, 
and my research suggested that there had only very recently been any water shortages in the area. 
It made no sense to me, but I supposed that meant the people of Prineville knew something I did 
not about water conservation. I snapped a photo of the field as I got into the truck, thinking I had 
better learn more about water use in the high desert before I finished this project. 
It was odd to contrast this scene with the Facebook data center. A week after stopping to 
take that picture, I was finally given permission to tour the buildings. There were no industrial 
sprinklers inside or outside the complex. I saw water exactly three times during my visit to 
Facebook: in the bathroom, inside the complimentary water bottle I received, and in one of the 
data center’s air-flow rooms. The guide assured me that the buildings were extremely 
environmentally friendly, and that water systems were continually monitored for efficiency. I 
watched as water dripped down walls that looked like soggy cardboard and was recirculated 
through oddly-shaped pipes. Though the guide was unable to provide the exact number of 
gallons of water the data center uses, I was surprised to see that it did not seem like very much. 
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In comparison to the farms I had seen lining Highway 126, the data center appeared to be using 
less water. That certainly rearranged my perception of big data companies. Yet still, I knew that 
water was not the only limited resource data centers use. Standing on the roof of the building, I 
squinted in the bright light, noticing massive water storage tanks and generators lining the 
building. I raised my eyebrows at the guide. “In case of emergencies,” he said, smiling. “We’ve 
got to be prepared.” 
 
 
Figure 12. Water spraying from industrial sprinklers across fields 
outside of Prineville, Oregon in the late afternoon. Photo by author. 
 
Data centers are where the cloud comes down to Earth. They are the places that we can 
see the real-world effects of our increasing desire to produce, consume, and store data 
(Starosielski and Walker 2016). Although it is hard to imagine a ‘cloud’—named after a 
perfectly natural part of our earth system—having any negative impacts on environmental health, 
there are very real consequences of our increasing data demands (Cubitt et al. 2011). As this 
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chapter will show, however, these consequences are highly nuanced. It is not so simple as to 
conclude that data centers are necessarily worse for social and environmental well-being than 
any other industry that may have chosen to locate in the same place. The real concern then, is 
perhaps more about whether or not the technology industry’s impacts at both local and global 
scales are worth problematizing. I believe that they are. 
   There are many ways to examine the environmental impact of data centers, but I will 
focus on four key areas to help explain these impacts: land, energy, water, and waste. The 
following sections will discuss how each of these elements, in turn, are affected by our growing 
data fetish. Continuing the conception of the New West 2.0, and drawing on concepts from 
Urban Political Ecology (UPE) and toxic dumping literature, I will try to answer the question 
what are the environmental impacts of data centers? Answering this question is more difficult 
than it seems.  
 One of the greatest challenges of researching data centers is that so little information is 
given out to the public about their operations. I had hoped this chapter would reveal in detail the 
specific environmental impacts of data centers at both local and global scales. Unfortunately, 
there is not much data that has been gathered about data centers. As previously noted, few 
scholars have researched the physical aspects of cloud computing, including land, water, and 
energy use for data centers. As such, this chapter relies largely on limited information provided 
by government agencies, NGOs, journalists, and big data companies themselves. Reports by 
these stakeholders are helpful, but even still, gaps remain, particularly in the case of waste and 
pollution. The lack of data on data centers is disconcerting. Nevertheless, what follows 
represents my attempt to determine the true nature of data centers and whether they are 
sustainable or not. 
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This Land Is Not Your Land… Or Is It? 
Traditionally, political ecologists have sought to unpack the social and environmental damage 
capitalism has caused through case studies of conflicts between poor rural communities and 
resource-extractive industries (Walker 2005). When I began this project, I was sure that I would 
be describing a similar situation with data centers in the rural American West. I thought my 
interviewees would tell tales of fighting hard for their right to the land and resources that were 
being taken from them, and of long debates between officials and residents that lasted late into 
the evenings. But this was not the case. After speaking with locals I quickly realized that I had 
exaggerated notions of drama surrounding data center construction and operation. However, just 
as ‘no result’ in a laboratory experiment is significant in and of itself, so too is ‘no drama.’ 
Prineville’s story, although not one of great contestation over the land and resources the 
Facebook and Apple data centers take, is important because it can spur discussions about the 
broader implications of future technological development. 
 
 On the surface, land use in Prineville and Central Oregon as a whole seems relatively 
simple. Prineville official Pete Stenner stated that in Central Oregon, “Everything that isn’t city 
is farmland or forest.” However, unlike many other states in the U.S., Oregon’s comprehensive 
plan is quite complex and well-developed (Walker and Hurley 2011). A comprehensive plan is a 
document that sets goals for statewide land use and development. Based on the premise that 
sprawl and resource waste must be avoided, Oregon’s comprehensive plan was created by 
Senator Hector Macpherson Jr in the 1970s. Macpherson allegedly had three primary goals in 
developing the planning system: to identify the “wisest use” of land for both the present and the 
future, to allow for public participation, and to incentivize communities to accept the plan rather 
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than coercing them (Walker and Hurley 2011, p. 25). With these goals in mind, the planning 
system was implemented in 1973, and after only a few modifications made over the last forty-
five years, it remains in place. The plan features a total of nineteen goals, and any cities or towns 
with a population over 2,500 people are required to comply with the statewide standards, though 
a few goals apply only to specific areas within the state. The Department of Land Conservation 
and Development (DLCD) and the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) 
review the county- and city-wide plans regularly to assure compliance throughout Oregon 
(Walker and Hurley 2011, p. 30).  
To provide a brief overview of the plan, the first and second goals emphasize citizen 
involvement and land use planning more broadly, while goals 2-7 focus on natural and 
cultural/historical resources. Goals 8-14 apply to the economy and development, which includes 
specifications about housing, waste, energy, and transportation. Goals 15-19 deal with specific 
areas within the state and are not relevant to planning in Central Oregon (Walker and Hurley 
2011, p. 30). It is worth highlighting Goal 2, which seeks to “establish a land use planning 
process and policy framework as a basis for all decisions and actions related to use of land and to 
assure an adequate factual base for such decisions and actions” (DCCP 2011, p. 3). This goal is 
important because in the past, it has been used to shift land use from forestry or agriculture to 
residential, with the claim that certain parcels were unsuitable for the former purposes (Walker 
and Hurley 2011, p. 31). As such, there is some flexibility in the plan, allowing for changes that 
mirror the increased demand for using land for new industries and purposes. It is also important 
to note that there are goals for recreational needs (Goal 8), energy conservation (Goal 13), and 
urbanization (Goal 14) in the plan as well (DLCD 2010). I highlight these goals because they 
display how Oregon attempts to contend with the inherently challenging task of fostering 
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economic development while conserving undeveloped land and natural resources. The tension 
this creates has become especially evident in recent years, as scholarship on the New West and 
rural gentrification indicates (e.g. Reisbame et al., 1997; Robbins 2005; Bryson 2010). These 
tensions are important in Prineville’s story as well, though in a nuanced way. 
In the 1990s, the basic statewide plan was modified slightly to create rural and urban 
‘reserves’ so that urban growth boundaries (UGBs) could be extended when cities wanted to 
expand their borders to accommodate population and infrastructural growth. The development of 
these reserves also meant that locals must now agree upon what land would remain dedicated to 
forestry and agriculture, and what land would be designated for future urbanization (Walker and 
Hurley 2011, p. 35-36). Furthermore, there was a push in the 1990s to emphasize problem-
solving at the regional level. A 1996 piece of legislation aimed to increase collaboration between 
cities in close proximity to avoid conflicting land-use plans, while also allowing for state control 
over planning (Walker and Hurley 2011, p. 36). These changes helped strengthen the plan and 
continue its widespread acceptance. The modified comprehensive plan has been increasingly 
important for Central Oregon in particular, as it has recently experienced the most rapid growth 
in the state (Jackson and Kuhlken 2006, p.171). For instance, Bend has had to consider possible 
UGB expansions as a result of tourism and subsequent increases in population (Walker and 
Hurley 2011, p. 40). While Prineville has experienced growth as well, growth there has been 
slower. However, with the new data center construction and its continual expansion, the town 
will surely be constantly (re)assessing the ‘wisest use’ for the land surrounding Prineville’s 
borders in coming years.  
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 The land that Facebook chose for its data center on the outskirts of Prineville had little 
significance to local residents. As director of a local charity foundation, Kirsten Smith, put it, if 
the land “had been good farmland, with access to water, it[s development] would have happened 
a long, long time ago. It wasn’t even really good for grazing. It was just rocks and sagebrush… 
[the data center] is just up there on top of a rock pile.” Similarly, local official Pete Stenner 
laughed as he showed me a picture of the data center site before Facebook built there. The image 
featured a beat-up abandoned car surrounded by desert shrubs and a sandy path that looked like it 
might have been a road for ATVs. He told me the land acted as a makeshift rifle range and 
teenage-trouble-maker hangout. In other words, the land space itself was not exactly cherished 
by Prineville residents—nor was it important for native plants and animals, as Stenner asserts. 
There were allegedly two environmental impact assessments completed prior to data center 
construction, but Facebook and the City of Prineville officials were unable to release these 
documents. 
Despite the locals’ apparent lack of concern about the land itself, they did have (and some 
still have) trouble accepting the tax breaks given to both Facebook and Apple by the city. 
However, as a member of the Crook County Chamber of Commerce, Cole Kent, pointed out, the 
land was producing no revenue for the town before Facebook purchased it. It was not within the 
tax base, and only once a private investor bought the land would it have generated any profit. So, 
the fact that a portion of the data center’s land is not yet on tax rolls, Kent asserts, should not 
concern residents. Facebook will be paying the town what they owe in a few more years. What is 
concerning, however, is the sheer amount of space the Prineville data centers and other data 
centers worldwide consume. 
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Data centers are massive. The Prineville complex currently houses three buildings, and 
each covers between 150,000 and 300,000 square feet—larger than two Walmart Supercenters 
put together (Data Center Knowledge 2010). Plans have recently been announced to expand this 
campus to five data centers, the two additional buildings spanning upwards of 450,000 square 
feet. Apple has also cleared land to begin constructing a third data center across the road from 
Facebook in Prineville (Miller 2017). More broadly speaking, Facebook is showing no signs of 
slowing construction either (Figure 13). For example, within the last two years alone, they have 
announced plans to construct multiple immense data centers in seven new locations 
worldwide:  Fort Worth, Texas; Clonee, Ireland; Los Lunas, New Mexico; Odense, Denmark; 
Papillion, Nebraska; New Albany, Ohio; and Henrico, Virginia (Facebook 2017). This rapid 
increase in land-grabbing suggests that in many diverse places where suitable land space is 
available for data centers, big data companies are taking advantage of it. 
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Figure 13. Locations of Facebook data centers in the United States. This map does not include those 
built or under construction abroad in Lulea, Sweden, Clonee, Ireland, and Odense, Denmark. Map by 
author. 
 
Yet it is hard to conclude that data centers are necessarily bad in terms of their land use—
or at least that they are any worse than any other industry. In a capitalist system, industries must 
necessarily grow to remain competitive (Brooks and Bryant 2014). If an industry larger than 
Facebook moved to Prineville, perhaps said industry would be claiming even more land. 
Moreover, in Prineville and some of the other sites, the land is not seemingly helping anyone by 
remaining vacant and collecting tumbleweeds. That said, data centers are enormous, and their 
physical footprint will get even larger as data demands increase and more storage space is 
required (Figure 14). It is worth questioning whether or not it is necessary to develop every piece 
of land available for development. Is it better to use the land for storing Facebook selfies and cat 
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videos, or for another farm that could grow food, but would also consume water and leech 
fertilizers and animal waste into nearby streams? Or is it better to simply leave the land to collect 
dust? The answer is hard to determine, since the ‘wisest use’ for land will depend on the person 
asked and the people with the power to make that decision. 
 
 
Figure 14. Facebook data centers in Prineville, Oregon in 2015. Since then, another data 
center has been built, and a fourth is under construction. Source: used with permission 
from http://svlg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SVLG-Presentation-10.25.13-
Facebook.pdf. 
 
Power IT Up 
In addition to taking up a lot of space, data centers are generally inefficient energy users (NRDC 
2014; Greenpeace 2017). The vast majority of the power going into these buildings ends up 
being wasted, since a typical data center server operates at less than 18 percent efficiency 
(NRDC 2014). This means that up to 82 percent of the energy entering an average data center 
server may be lost, usually as heat (NRDC 2104). Perhaps to combat the notoriety for 
inefficiency, Facebook measures its data centers’ power usage in terms of a Power Usage 
Effectiveness (PUE) ratio. PUE scores represent the amount of power coming into a data center 
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divided by the amount used by computing equipment inside of it (Green on Facebook 2017). 
Facebook proudly displays an average PUE of 1.10 for all data centers on its sustainability 
website. The EPA standard is 1.5 (Facebook Sustainability 2017). Yet some have criticized the 
validity of PUE as a way to measure energy usage because it says little about the actual amount 
of energy being consumed by data centers, and therefore conceals their aggregate environmental 
impacts (Brady et al. 2013; Burrington 2015).  
The Information Technology (IT) sector consumes about 7 percent of global electricity 
(Greenpeace 2017), and data centers are responsible for using approximately 1.5 percent of that 
total (Koomey 2011). Overall, data centers consumed 91 billion kWh of electricity globally in 
2013, a figure that has been predicted to almost double by 2020. This amount would mean data 
centers will require the energy equivalent of fifty coal-fired power plants (NRDC 2014). As of 
2016, Facebook used an average of 1.83 million MWh of electricity annually, almost all of 
which was consumed by data centers. The Prineville site alone used 327,000 MWh of the total 
that year (Facebook Sustainability 2017). Furthermore, a worldwide increase in electricity use 
for computing and secondary building services by data centers, in combination with a rising 
number of servers needed to support data demands, has led to a higher level of CO2 emissions by 
big data companies in recent years (Brady et al. 2013). Consequently, the IT sector now accounts 
for approximately two percent of global CO2 emissions (Whitehead et al. 2014). The carbon 
footprint of all Facebook’s buildings in 2016 was 718,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (MT CO2e). 516,000 of those 718,000 MT CO2e came from data center operations, 
and 239,000 MT CO2e came from the Prineville site specifically (Facebook Sustainability 2017). 
For comparison, these amounts are on the order of thousands of times higher than a typical 
college campus and hundreds of times higher than grocery stores on average in the United States 
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(National Grid 2002, 2013). It is thus clear that big data companies are major energy users, and 
as their physical footprint grows, so too will their power usage. 
 Perhaps the more concerning question is where exactly data centers are getting their 
power. Many make use of ‘dirty’ energy sources, such as coal-fired power plants, because they 
are currently the cheapest (Greenpeace 2017). Of course, where the power comes from largely 
depends on a data center’s location, and some big data companies are trying to curb this energy-
intensive trend. Influential companies like Facebook, Google, and Apple have begun to 
publically invest in renewable energy sources to power their data centers. For example, 
Facebook has made deals with local renewable energy companies in each new construction site 
since 2015. More specifically, the company most recently partnered with Dominion Energy in 
Henrico County, Virginia to power their two planned data centers with solar power (Augusta 
Free Press 2017). Facebook has also invested in Tradewind Energy in Omaha, Nebraska to buy 
200 MW of wind power for their data centers in Papillion, 120 miles away (Spaen 2017). 
Greenpeace (2017) praises companies like Facebook for beginning this new environmentally-
friendly trend, but many other data centers still rely on fossil fuels to run, emitting millions of 
metric tons of carbon into the atmosphere each year. As such, if we were able to ‘green’ the IT 
industry, it could greatly help the effort to combat climate change (Starosielski and Walker 
2016). 
 That said, Prineville in particular posed an unanticipated challenge to Facebook’s climate 
change mitigation efforts. According to the local Facebook PR President Luke Weston, “In 
Prineville, Facebook would like to have access to more renewable power but we are challenged 
by the site, utility, and boundaries.” The company, Weston assured me, supported legislation to 
help launch the Voluntary Renewable Energy Tariff (VRET) process in 2014, which would 
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allow Facebook and other companies to secure low-cost renewables. Weston noted that 
unfortunately, the VRET docket has not yet been successfully implemented by the Oregon Public 
Utility Commission. The Prineville data centers thus obtain their power from the same company 
most Prineville residents do, Pacific Power.  
In terms of renewable energy use, 71 percent of electricity in Oregon comes from 
hydropower, and Prineville has at least six hydroelectric and two solar power plants within 60 
miles of the town’s center (U.S. EIA 2017). Pacific Power, however, currently sources the 
majority of its electricity from coal-fired power plants, even though the nearest coal-fired power 
plant to Prineville is over 100 miles away (U.S. EIA 2017). The reason for this apparent 
discrepancy is because, as an employee from the company specified, “Once electrons are put into 
the system [via any source], they are only traceable system-wide…so, while it is likely that 
Prineville is getting electrons from hydropower, there is no way to actually track that.” In other 
words, the data center might be getting electricity from hydropower plants nearby, but because 
Pacific Power also gets electricity from coal-fired power plants across the United States and puts 
it into the same grid, they cannot be certain that Facebook is being powered by renewable energy 
sources alone. Fortunately, however, Pacific Power is gradually adding more renewables—
specifically wind power—to their mix in response to the Oregon Clean Electricity & Coal 
Transition Law. The company has promised to be completely coal-free by 2030 (Pacificorp IRP 
2017).  
So, despite the challenges of measuring renewable energy use, Facebook set a goal in 
2012 to have 25 percent clean and renewable energy in their electricity supply mix in 2015 for 
all data centers, and were able to exceed that. As a result, Facebook is now aiming to have at 
least 50 percent clean and renewable energy in their mix by 2018 (Facebook Sustainability 
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2017). Doing so has greatly reduced the carbon footprint of the majority of their data centers. 
This attention to renewable energy sources is a promising trend in data center construction. 
 Taken as a whole, the electricity usage of data centers is certainly alarming. Although 
specific data for the amount of electricity used by the town before and after data center 
construction, according to Prineville’s latest Adopted Budget for fiscal year 2017, the city has 
been collecting increasingly large electrical franchise fees. In the report, they specifically site 
how the ‘local data centers’ were instrumental in the increase of annual fees from $350,000 in 
2010 (the year the Facebook data center was constructed) to a projected $2,225,000 in 2018 
(City of Prineville 2018). This sharp increase suggests that the Prineville data centers are 
continually drawing more power from the local electricity grid. Nonetheless, there is more to this 
issue than simply saying data centers are contributing to climate change. Following the larger 
‘greening’ trend, big data companies have been slowly committing to environmentally-friendly 
practices in general, such as investments in renewables and efforts to find new technological 
systems that limit water and electricity waste in data centers (Greenpeace 2017). As such, it 
appears that in the coming years, data centers will likely not be much worse than many other 
industries in terms of electricity and power demands, provided that they continue to invest in 
renewable energy. However, as the following sections of this chapter will show, electricity use is 
only one of many factors adding to the environmental impacts of data centers. Namely, water 
and waste are also important issues to discuss in more detail, especially in the high desert of 
Central Oregon. 
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Water IT Down 
It takes a large amount of water to support the world’s data. Studies from Hewitt-Packard (HP) 
Laboratories show that a typical 1 MW data center uses about 18,000 gallons of water a day, or 
68 cubic-meters (Sharma et al. 2008). Although not all data centers currently use water to cool 
their servers, it is still very common (Pickren 2016). Based on Entity Water Reports from 
Oregon Water Resources Department1, Facebook’s data center in Prineville used about 9 million 
gallons of water from their privately-owned wells in 2016. In 2014, they also used about 1.3 
million gallons of water from Prineville streams (Darling 2015). In combination with Apple’s 
draw of millions of gallons from the city each year, these data centers have placed extra demand 
on an already stressed water system. This prompted The Bulletin, a local Central Oregon 
newspaper, to post an article online entitled, “Water sources scarce near Prineville: City tries 
various solutions, including mapping underwater ‘streams’” (Hidle 2011). Though perhaps 
slightly exaggerated, the article’s title is fitting. Irrigation has historically proven a challenge for 
Oregon as a whole, but it is especially problematic in the arid regions of the state such as 
Prineville. Precipitation in these areas tends to take place outside of the growing season, making 
farming nearly impossible without irrigation infrastructure in place (Robbins 2004, p. 101). 
Although most of the contestation about irrigation projects has occurred elsewhere, such as the 
Klamath Basin, water is certainly a prized natural resource in Central Oregon due to its limited 
availability (Robbins 2004, p. 105). As local official Pete Stenner put it, “Water is very limited in 
our area and it is all allocated. There is no extra water… [but this] community has always been 
focused on conservation of water for hundreds of years.” Pete’s comment seemed odd, however, 
based on the fact that while driving into Prineville I saw industrial sprinklers spanning across 
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acres of fields, spurting water in the 100-degree heat at high noon. Conservation apparently has 
different meanings in different places. 
 The data centers in Prineville are without a doubt taking some of the town’s precious 
water too; however, were another industry to develop the same plot of land, it is possible that 
water supply may have become even scarcer. For instance, Prineville official Evan Kasey noted 
that the data centers are surprisingly not the top water users in Prineville. The golf course in town 
uses about 1 million gallons per day—or 365 million gallons a year—and local farms average at 
about 10,000 gallons per day (Darling 2015). Clearly, data centers are not the only industries 
stressing the irrigation system. Prineville draws water from wells in the city, as well as streams—
and up until recently, they were struggling not to waste significant amounts of it. In 2016, the 
City of Prineville website posted figures for their “unaccounted for water percentage” over the 
course of the past decade. The city allegedly pumped 615 million gallons of water in 2008, but 
lost almost 172 million gallons of it, or about 28 percent of Prineville’s total water supply (City 
of Prineville 2016). Prineville has to comply with the regulation requirements that mandate 
mitigation credits must be purchased before wells are drilled, so it is hard for them to add new 
water sources from which they can draw (Hidle 2011). More recently, however, Evan Kasey and 
his team worked to reduce the total water loss to about 4 percent in 2015 through infrastructural 
improvements. These improvements, interestingly, were made possible in part because of the 
data centers’ arrival.   
Facebook in particular publically takes pride in minimizing water usage at their data 
centers. They have essentially designed their data centers to be self-contained climate systems. 
Luke Weston, with Facebook’s PR team, asserts that Facebook saves a large amount of energy 
by using evaporative cooling rather than the cooling towers and chillers that traditional data 
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centers have used (Figure 15). Their system involves a simple series of rooms, each of which 
houses different walls that control the air flow composition and temperature. Air enters from 
outside in a room above the servers and is mixed with hot air from below as it passes through a 
filter wall. This stage is called ‘outside air economization’ (Leed 2012). The next stage, 
evaporative cooling, occurs as the air passes through a misting wall. The wall contains misting 
devices that lower the temperature of the air significantly as they change liquid water to water 
vapor in the direct path of air supplying the servers below (Leed 2012). The misting system 
contains ‘booster pumps’ that take water from the water storage tanks outside the data center and 
filter it by pumping the water through carbon filters. Water softeners are used to extract minerals 
such as magnesium and calcium. About 85 percent of the misted water evaporates into the air 
stream, while 15 percent goes into a ‘mist eliminator.’ This water goes through a micron filter 
and UV lamp, ultimately leading to water storage tanks to conserve water (Leed 2012). In the 
final stage, the fans move air into the data center through ‘dry wall supply airshafts’ (Leed 2012). 
According to Weston, a new ‘wetted media’ cooling system has also recently replaced the 
misting system to help eliminate the need for water treatment. 
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Figure 15. The climate system of Facebook data centers. The top image compares 
Prineville’s system to traditional data centers, while the bottom is a more detailed 
diagram of the system’s interworking. Source: used with permission from 
http://svlg.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SVLG-Presentation-10.25.13-Facebook.pdf. 
 
 
This new method of water usage is an improvement over past data centers’ designs, but 
the water demands are still quite high. Several towns have struggled to meet other data centers’ 
demands. For instance, a National Security Agency (NSA) data center in Bluffdale, Utah has 
attracted controversy because of its water use practices (Hogan 2015). A local representative 
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wanted to halt the data center’s water supply after journalists exposed that the NSA had made a 
deal with the town to get water for less than city guidelines mandate because the agency claimed 
they would boost the economy with their new pipelines (Carlisle 2014; Hogan 2015). After a 
series of electrical failures and seizure of more than the NSA’s allotted water intake, locals were 
ready to rid of the data center, regardless of whether or not it brought any economic prosperity 
(Carlisle 2013). It is thus clear that data centers’ water use can elicit controversy if big data 
companies are careless about how they utilize local resources. Based on the lack of water wars 
near Facebook data centers (so far), however, the company is once again seemingly ahead of 
other industries on developing ways to have less of a negative environmental impact. 
Facebook measures its water consumption using ‘water usage effeciveness’ (WUE), 
which is similar to PUE. Created by the company in 2012, WUE is a ratio of water used by the 
data center divided by the energy used by the servers (Facebook Sustainability 2017). The 
average WUE for all data centers in 2016 was 0.21; however, because The Green Grid and 
Facebook developed the WUE measurement so recently, there is no baseline or standard for 
comparison (Facebook Sustainability 2017). Regardless, the company is trying hard to find ways 
to save water, and of course, money. Weston noted how “Facebook also reuses water as much as 
possible. If the original water quality is high, we can reuse it multiple times. When we can no 
longer reuse the water, it is discharged back into the sewer system for treatment.” Therefore, not 
only is water access and affordability important for data center locations, so too is waste 
disposal. 
It is important to note that little data has been collected about pollution of water resources 
as a result of data center operations. Most articles concerning data center pollution focus solely 
on carbon emissions from use of coal or other non-renewables to power the buildings (Koomey 
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2011; Ristic et al. 2015). Water footprint measurements have been established, however, which 
do include a pollution component. If data centers are designed such that they have “once-through 
cooling systems without a cooling pond,” they will discharge hot water, resulting in thermal 
pollution (Ristic et al. 2015, p. 11268). Chemicals may also be emitted from data centers that 
have cooling towers, as water will need treating and replacing in the coolant loop to prevent the 
servers from overheating (Ristic et al 2015). Nevertheless, the pollution measurement is not 
widely used, if at all by big data companies to date. Facebook and Apple were unresponsive to 
questions about possible water pollutants coming from their data centers. Despite the lack of 
communication by big data companies, journalists have discussed how even the most water-
efficient data centers cannot recycle water endlessly because minerals tend to build up, clogging 
the system (Rogoway 2016; McLaughin 2017). These mineral buildups are not particularly 
concerning for the environment, but heat pollution can pose a threat to local ecosystems if the 
water is not cooled before sending it to the treatment plant. In short, the pollution of water by 
data centers can neither be confirmed nor denied until big data companies release this 
information. Their silence on the matter is troubling. 
Water use and pollution is thus another area in data centers’ environmental impacts that 
remains open to debate. It seems like Facebook, Apple, and other companies may be attempting 
to conserve water resources with new, more water-efficient cooling systems. Moreover, any 
pollutants their data centers discharge are likely better for the environment than are the chemical 
fertilizers and animal waste emitted by industrial agriculture operations. However, without 
widespread use of measurements like WUE and water footprint, there is simply not enough data 
to conclude that data centers are good or bad in terms of their effects on the hydrological cycle, 
locally or globally. If big data companies were more open about their water usage, perhaps their 
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operations would seem less suspicious. Until then, it is worth questioning all the claims these 
companies make about being ‘green,’ when they give no evidence to support this conclusion. 
Relatedly, the following section will address several localized and broader concerns about waste 
related to data storage, consumption, and production—another matter on which big data 
companies remain mute. 
 
Don’t Waste IT 
There are two categories of waste from data centers. The first is waste from the data center itself. 
Beyond the trash generated by their offices, the data center sullies the water it uses, as previously 
mentioned. This means that when data centers move in, small-scale waste systems in towns like 
Prineville must suddenly handle a large amount of wastewater from this industrial facility. The 
second category of waste is electronic waste (e-waste) that comes from the data centers and is 
shipped elsewhere. Servers can only last so long, and where the waste machinery is deposited is 
an important consideration for human and environmental health. Moreover, data centers’ 
existence presumably allows for more electronic device usage, ultimately leading to more e-
waste from the frequent disposal of said devices for newer, faster models (Forge 2007). 
Considering data center waste is imperative for analyzing both the environmental and 
geographical implications of data center construction, as the effects of this infrastructure are 
manifested at both local and global scales. 
 As suggested by the above sections in this chapter, the Facebook has made efforts to 
mitigate the large-scale environmental impacts of their data centers, and other companies have 
followed their example. At a more local scale, the data center in Prineville has implications for 
the town’s ability to handle the extra load of waste added to its system. According to local 
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officials, Facebook paid a “system development charge” to assure that the company would pay 
for the part of the wastewater treatment plant they would need to use for their operations. 
Prineville was struggling to improve the facility’s efficiency when the data centers moved in. 
More recently, however, the town finished a 120-acre wetlands project in which they built a 
buffer zone for wastewater to avoid spending about $60 billion on improvements to their current 
system (McDuff 2017). This project was made possible by a $1 million grant from the USDA, in 
addition to contributions from the data centers and other local companies (McDuff 2017). The 
wetlands project is another good example of how data centers stress local infrastructure, but the 
companies that own them are working to mitigate these stresses by improving systems of energy 
delivery and waste treatment. Nonetheless, data centers will still grow in size and number to 
meet rising data storage needs, which will increase the aggregate demand on waste disposal 
systems no matter how efficient the buildings are. As such, it is unclear at what point small 
towns like Prineville will no longer have enough infrastructure capacity to handle data center 
expansions, regardless of the mitigation efforts and system improvements big data companies 
may make. 
 Although Facebook is seemingly able to assure that their data centers’ wastewater has 
little negative impact on their host towns, they are curiously silent on the subject of direct and 
indirect e-waste related to their data center operations. When I asked the Facebook data center 
tour guide about where their unusable servers went, his response was very vague. He mentioned 
that he thought the company had “some sort of recycling program” for them, but ultimately they 
would end up wherever the rest of Facebook’s e-waste was transported. Finding out the exact 
end-location for data center e-waste has yet to be accomplished by myself, or any other 
researchers to my knowledge, which is odd considering the fact that Facebook founded the Open 
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Compute Project in attempt to be more open with the public about their operations. Their 
sustainability website does not provide any information about electronics recycling, although 
they do note that their offices have compost and recycling bins (Facebook Sustainability 2017). 
Google is the only big data company that seems to be making an effort to be more open about 
their waste stream. They recently released a report about their partnering with the Ellen 
MacArthur Foundation (EMF), to introduce ‘circular economy’ practices to their company. 
According to the report, “Key elements of the circular economy model optimise resources by 
circulating products, components and materials in use through different loops of the use cycle,” 
including maintenance, remanufacturing, reuse, and recycling (Rana and Brandt 2016). The 
authors conclude that Google manages its non-reusable or sellable waste by sending them “to a 
recycling partner for secure processing and recycling” (Rana and Brandt 2016). While Google’s 
report is also somewhat vague, it is the only such report I have found in my research on data 
center e-waste. 
There is plenty of grey literature on the matter of data center e-waste, but scholars have 
not examined data centers’ role in contributing to the IT industry’s resource consumption, waste, 
and dumping. Journalists covering the technology and/or environmental beat have suggested that 
as even as the devices consumers buy are getting smaller, the data centers needed to support 
them are expanding (Clancy 2013). This expansion has meant more waste, especially considering 
the fact that, similar to personal electronic devices, data center equipment is constantly updated. 
Big data companies must therefore continually bring in new servers and computers and get rid of 
the unusable ones (Gossin and LaBrie 2013; Clark 2014). Measureable standards have 
apparently been created by companies such as the Green Grid, which published a white paper 
about an Electronics Disposal Efficiency (EDE) metric that shows the proportion of the total 
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weight of equipment that was decommissioned by known responsible groups (Brown et al. 
2013). In remains to be seen whether or not EDE, like PUE and WUE, is a useful measurement, 
especially considering the fact that big data companies such as Google or Facebook have yet to 
use it. Moreover, the ‘responsible groups’ in the EDE equation are not necessarily easy to find, 
since the majority of ‘green’ recyclers do not seem to mention the ultimate resting place for the 
potentially dangerous and toxic wastes generated by data centers2. Presumably, these facilities’ 
e-waste ends up in the same places documented by the Basal Action Network (BAN) and other 
researchers (Clark 2014), but without any concrete e-waste information from data companies, no 
definite conclusions can be made about the environmental impacts of direct e-waste from data 
centers. 
 Indirect e-waste, however, has been documented by several scholars and research 
organizations (e.g. BAN 2002; Gabrys 2011; Maxwell and Miller 2011). Data centers arguably 
help foster our obsession with technological devices. Their services support all the data needs for 
mobile phones, computers, laptops, tablets, etc. that have rapidly increased in number in recent 
years (Pew Research 2017). Research by NGOs such as BAN and others shows that each year, 
billions of pounds of toxic waste are dumped in developing countries, such as remote portions of 
China and Africa, unbeknownst to most American citizens (Brigden et al. 2005; Widmer et al. 
2005; Gabrys 2011). Not only are these wastes harmful to the environment, but they also take the 
lives of thousands of people who generally do not produce the waste themselves (BAN 2002; 
Brigden et al. 2005). As such, it is evident why a small, but well-developed scholarly literature 
has emerged about the toxic dumping and e-waste. Much of this scholarship could be categorized 
as a critique of consumption and technology, but environmental and social justice discussions are 
also largely important in forming a theoretical basis for understanding the impacts of e-waste. 
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A central theory examined in this literature is that of ‘commodity fetishism.’ Marx (1976) 
established the concept to describe how people in modern society develop a love affair with the 
‘products of labor.’ More importantly however, not only do they become obsessed with material 
goods, but consumers are detached from the means of production by a “veil of market-exchange” 
(Brooks and Bryant 2014, p. 2). Consequently, industries have an excuse to both exploit natural 
and human resources and to overproduce because consumers believe they need more goods than 
they actually do (Marcuse 1964; Brooks and Bryant 2014). Marxist scholars thus contend that 
labor is at the core of capitalism and consumption. Yet as Maxwell and Miller (2012, p. 88) put 
it, “Since the nineteenth century, capitalism has largely treated labor and the environment as 
things to be controlled long distance, connected to transnational textual and military 
domination.” Consequently, consumers in the global North cannot see the negative impacts of 
the products they buy, and because they do not produce these things themselves, they cannot 
possibly understand what it takes to create the tiny gadgets in their hands. Hence, as Gabrys 
(2011, p.106) states, “commodity and rubbish anticipate each other.” Of course, what scholars 
have failed to note, is that these technological commodities are now reliant on the existence of 
data centers.  
 Although it would be an overstatement to say data centers are completely responsible for 
global e-waste and toxic dumping, their contribution to the problem should not be ignored. They 
are certainly allowing our fetishism to continue and grow, particularly in the face of increasingly 
rapid production, use, and disposal of technological devices. As such, it is crucial that scholars 
begin to examine the social and environmental impacts of wastes that data centers may generate 
both directly and indirectly. It is also important for NGOs like BAN and Greenpeace to continue 
publishing reports featuring case studies of the real-world impacts of the cloud, including e-
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waste, so that big data companies can be held responsible for better waste disposal practices in 
the future. 
As such, e-waste is another grey area for the environmental impacts of data centers. At 
the local scale, in Prineville for instance, it is unlikely that the wastes produced by data centers 
have any impact at all. At a global scale, however, the impact of data centers’ e-waste is 
potentially threatening to human and environmental health. But again, because big data 
companies are unwilling to share information about their large-scale waste disposal (unless it 
makes their company look good, that is), it cannot be said for sure whether or not data centers are 
truly any worse for the environment than any other industry that produces wastes. So, perhaps 
the better question is: at what scale are data center operations truly sustainable? 
 
Is IT Sustainable? 
Perhaps the most important implication of data center operation for the environment is the multi-
scale nature of their impacts. The localized effects of data centers seem minimal. As I will 
discuss further in the next chapter, the Prineville example shows how conscientious companies 
like Facebook attempt to minimize their impacts on a local scale by improving the town’s 
infrastructure and choosing sites that are not otherwise economically or ecologically productive. 
Looking at data center operations on a micro-scale thus makes them appear almost entirely 
beneficial. On a broader scale however, data centers’ potential negative impacts are hard to 
overlook. Although many companies such as Google, Facebook, and Apple are making efforts to 
be more environmentally responsible, data centers will presumably need vast infrastructural 
improvements if they wish to have no harmful impacts. 
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Since capitalism requires endless growth and tends toward ecological crisis (Foster et al. 
2010), big data companies will necessarily take up more space and resources—and produce more 
waste—as operations expand and spatial crises emerge. Consequently, in terms of land, data 
centers can and will be taking up more space worldwide, and there is no guarantee that they will 
always choose vacant teenager hangouts covered in dust. Facebook and Apple are certainly 
expanding operations in Prineville due to the fact that its climate is ideal for cheap cooling 
(Miller 2017), but money is most likely the true deciding factor in location decisions. Big data 
companies will choose those that offer tax breaks and access to cheap land, water, and power 
over any others (Hogan 2013, 2015). Why else would they choose to build in the middle of 
remote rural areas worldwide? Moreover, many data centers are still inefficient energy and water 
users too, which means they are contributing to climate change and wasting natural resources, 
regardless of how ‘green’ they claim to be. In short, an increase in the number of data centers 
will certainly mean an increase in resource use—and subsequently, an increase in the amount of 
waste with which we must contend on a global scale. 
Taking all this into consideration, it is clear that at a macro-scale, data centers are an 
ecological and political problem. Their localized effects may appear minimal, but globally, the 
aggregate total of resources taken and wastes produced will be progressively larger. Moreover, e-
waste disposal and water pollution must be addressed because they are environmental justice 
issues that, unless they prove otherwise, big data companies will need to take part in mitigating 
as their operations multiply. Even so, on any scale, it is fundamentally unclear whether or not 
data centers are any worse for the environment than any other industry. Again, there simply is 
not currently enough information available to the public for anyone to make a definitive 
conclusion about the full environmental impacts of data centers. The data big data companies do 
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release is selectively positive and posits the companies as wholly environmentally-friendly 
without mentioning anything about their e-waste disposal or possible water and air pollution. 
Doing so would, of course, shatter the fragile façade of eco-friendly data centers, which is a very 
profitable business strategy. It is the avoidance of full-disclosure on the part of big data 
companies, however, that makes the issue of environmental impacts one worth problematizing. 
The nature of data centers is, then, that their impacts on the environment are highly nuanced and 
largely uncertain—but they will surely have important implications for human and ecological 
health worldwide. It would be wise for scholars to draw attention to these possible implications 
in the near future, since as the following chapter will show, big data companies work hard to 
assure that we cannot identify data centers’ true nature. 
 
Notes 
 
1. Figures calculated based on reports posted on the OWRD website. Available at 
https://apps.wrd.state.or.us/apps/wr/wateruse_query/wr_wur_entity_report.aspx?directory_id
=127318&start_year=&end_year= 
 
2. See for example: World Data Products https://www.wdpi.com/ or Green Recycling Co. 
https://www.greenrecyclingco.com/index.html 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
LIGHT GREEN DATA CENTERS 
 
  
On June 1, 2017 Apple CEO Tim Cook wrote a succinct, but noteworthy letter to his employees. 
It was not a letter about technology or profits, as one might expect from the head of a powerful 
tech company. Cook was writing in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to 
withdraw from the Paris Agreement a few days earlier. In the letter he wrote: 
Climate change is real and we all share a responsibility to fight it. I want to 
reassure you that today’s developments will have no impact on Apple's efforts to 
protect the environment. We power nearly all of our operations with renewable 
energy, which we believe is an example of something that's good for our planet 
and makes good business sense as well… Our mission has always been to leave 
the world better than we found it. We will never waver, because we know that 
future generations depend on us (Bell 2017). 
 
Cook’s words might seem surprising considering how technological development and 
environmentalism have historically been cast as opposites (Bess 2003). It is also unexpected that 
a big data company, especially Apple, would make such bold statements. Some might argue that 
Cook’s comments are nothing more than ‘greenwashing.’ The term ‘greenwashing’ was 
developed to describe when corporations give only selective positive information about their 
green practices to create a favorable public image (Bowen and Aragon-Correa 2014; Villarino 
and Font 2015). Yet Cook’s words are not so hollow. As this chapter will show, they are 
reflective of a larger green ethos present in Silicon Valley, as well as among many tech 
companies worldwide. Cook’s green vision has deep roots, as it echoes green ideas reminiscent 
of the American counterculture and the Whole Earth Catalogs produced by Stewart Brand in the 
1960s (Kirk 2008). Furthermore, examining Cook’s words in a more contemporary view, his 
letter supports the notion that increasingly more industries have adopted green visions, whether 
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they are greenwashing or not. These visions indicate the pervasiveness of what Michael Bess 
(2003) deems the ‘light-green society.’ 
 Bess’s book, The Light Green Society: Ecology and Technological Modernity in 
France, 1960-2000, traces the development of the environmental movement in France and its 
social impacts since 1960. He describes how an unlikely balance between radical 
environmentalism and postwar modernization developed, resulting in a half-revolution embodied 
by France’s ‘light-green society.’ Bess explains how France ardently adopted and developed new 
technologies in postwar years—nuclear in particular—because they were afraid that their country 
would die out if they did not keep up with technological development in other nations. Yet the 
French people also consequently began to fear the disappearance of their nation’s romanticized 
peasant life in an untrammeled countryside. Accordingly, France experienced a shift towards 
conservation and environmental awareness in the 1960s and 1970s. As such, citizens of France 
were faced with two drastically different alternatives—radical environmentalism or industrial 
modernism—neither of which was entirely satisfactory alone. So, they simply chose the middle 
ground: a watered-down version of both environmentalism and modernism combined, the light-
green society. 
Bess’s book shows that environmentalism comes in various shades of green. For him, the 
light-green shade is representative of the “moderation, compromise, half-measures [and] the 
profound ambiguity that has characterized the reception of ecological ideas among the French 
citizenry” (Bess 2003, p. 3). Although referring to specifically to France in his book, Bess (2003, 
p. 237) assures readers that what is occurring in France is reflective of a larger global trend, 
visible in many different industrialized nations. The importance of Bess’s light-green society 
concept, then, is that it shows how technological development and environmentalism can and do 
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coexist. Even as we place them on opposite ends of the natural spectrum, in many nations people 
have decided that neither is more important than the other, and the two do not necessarily have to 
be mutually exclusive. In short, the compromises and half-measures that embody a light-green 
society are a result of the desire to be simultaneously environmentally conscious and mass-
consumers, and to cherish the traditional while also embracing the modern (Bess 2003, p. 4). The 
visions of big data companies like Apple exemplify how many parts of the developed world have 
become light-green societies, including the American West in particular. 
 
Drawing on the work of those who have studied the green ethos of the American West 
(e.g. Kirk 2008; Isaacson 2011), documents from the Breakthrough Institute,1 and from news 
stories about Facebook’s and Apple’s CEOs, this chapter will describe how the collision of 
technophilia and environmentalism fostered in Silicon Valley is reflected by data center 
construction in small rural towns. I will show how data centers are the physical manifestations of 
the green ethos common in the Bay Area and Silicon Valley. I argue that Facebook and Apple’s 
environmental visions echo key themes in ecomodernism, particularly from the Ecomodernist 
Manifesto. I will also examine the deeper roots of the ecomodernist philosophy by analyzing 
Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog and the idea of ‘appropriate technology.’ Although big 
data companies like Facebook and Apple are at their core profit-seeking companies that 
influence our everyday lives in a myriad of ways, considering the strides they have made toward 
‘greening’ capitalism, one cannot say with certainty that money is their sole motivator. They 
have in fact become an asset for small communities like Prineville. Thus, perhaps the green 
technology Facebook and Apple embrace will help fix—or at least mitigate—the destruction 
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caused by industrial capitalism since its advent, and data centers can help continue the progress 
toward a greener capitalism.  
 
A ‘Brand’ New Way of Thinking 
The roots of Facebook and Apple’s green capitalist visions stem from the American 
countercultural movement and the story of Stewart Brand. As this section will explain, as a 
Stanford graduate and founder of the Whole Earth Catalog, Stewart Brand was arguably one of 
the most important figures in rise of the ‘appropriate technology’ (AT) movement in the United 
States, and the American West in particular (Kirk 2008). This movement and the associated 
green ethos that it embraces has helped set the standards for modern Bay Area technology 
companies and their data center operations.  
In February 1966, Stewart Brand sat on North Beach in San Francisco, California. He had 
just taken LSD, and this particular trip would be an important one, one that would generate big 
change. There on the beach, Brand decided to ask, “Why haven’t we seen a photograph of the 
whole Earth yet?” (Brand 1977). After that day, he called for the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) to show everyone what the earth looked like from space. A year later, 
his drug-induced wish came true. The resulting picture could be cited as one of the first steps 
toward the environmental movement of the 1970s (Kirk 2007, 2008). In a similar vein of 
thought, two years later, Brand founded the Whole Earth Catalog, a publication that was meant 
to mix “the liberal social values of the counterculture with the technological enthusiasm of his 
Stanford classmates” and “advocate decentralized organization” (Kirk 2008, p. 294). This 
catalog’s goal was essentially to marry technology and environmentalism—a goal that seems 
  92 
almost oxymoronic at first, but is nonetheless an increasingly popular vision (Rome 2017), 
especially in the New West 2.0. 
 Brand was a key figure in the American countercultural movements of the 1960s and 
1970s (Kirk 2008). Despite the common popularized tropes about the American counterculture, 
there have been many different versions of counterculture throughout American history 
(Braunstein and Doyle 2002). The word ‘counterculture’ likely inspires images of anti-
establishment, liberal hippies on communes, trying to grow their own food and to live without 
the help of the technology. However, counterculture is defined in various ways depending on the 
context in which it is used. In their volume on the subject, Peter Braunstein and Michael Doyle 
(2002, p. 10) explain that counterculture was less of a “movement” and more of a “direction.” 
The American counterculture was “an inherently unstable collection of attitudes, tendencies, 
postures, ‘lifestyles,’ ideals, visions, hedonistic pleasures, moralisms, negations, and 
affirmations.”  And the people involved were those “who defined themselves first by what they 
were not” rather than what they actually were (Braunstein and Doyle 2002, p. 10). The 
commonalities amongst the various versions of counterculture were that these groups of 
individuals believed that the nation’s culture was in need of change, and that change could be 
made by large numbers of people modifying their behavior on an individual basis (Braunstein 
and Doyle 2002, p.10). In short, they were pushing for liberation and reform. It makes sense 
then, that in the 1970s, the counterculture manifested itself in fragmented movements of different 
capacity, but with the similar core value of creating and supporting an ‘alternative lifestyle’ 
(Braunstein and Doyle 2002, p. 12). One of those movements was founded upon ideas put forth 
by Stewart Brand and his organization. 
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Brand’s version of American counterculture envisioned a future that, unlike traditional 
environmentalist visions of utopia, included and relied upon ‘appropriate technology’ (AT) 
because he was convinced that technology would allow humans and nature to co-exist (Kirk 
2008). The AT movement, stemming primarily from anti-war New Left environmental politics, 
forwarded the idea that small-scale, individualized technology made by self-educated people was 
the panacea for the environmentally destructive system of capitalism (Kirk 2002, p. 360). In this 
view, simple, low-cost, ecologically safe technology would lead to self-sufficiency and a new, 
more democratic social structure. In response to the evident damage post-war industrialization 
had on the environment, people like Brand began trying to “reconcile dreams for reform with 
competing fears that the [capitalistic] system was beyond repair” (Kirk 2002, p. 358). The 
resultant philosophy of technophilia and a hope for a ‘greener capitalism’ laid the foundation for 
Stewart Brand’s business model, and would also influence other Silicon Valley companies in 
later years. As Andrew Kirk (2008, p. 296) puts it, “Brand was a pioneer in the greening of 
American business, and his corporations were a harbinger of a new political calculus at least two 
decades ahead of its time.” 
Brand’s pioneering is evident in the foundation of Bay Area tech companies, especially 
Apple (Isaacson 2011). Steve Jobs, Apple’s founder, was largely influenced by Brand and the 
AT counterculture. Jobs allegedly embodied the “fusion of flower power and processor power, 
enlightenment and technology” (Isaacson 2011, p. 56). He was an avid reader of the Whole Earth 
Catalog, and Brand himself was quoted as deeming Jobs to be “‘at the nexus of the 
counterculture and technology’” (Isaacson 2011, p. 59). The connections between the companies 
that run modern data centers and the AT counterculture of the past are clear in that the very 
founders of Silicon Valley-based tech companies embrace the same valuation of both technology 
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and environmentalism simultaneously. Although the counterculture is no longer its own separate 
way of life, its remnants can still be found, exemplified in the way companies in the Bay Area, 
such as Apple and Facebook, operate. 
The counterculture manifested in the Whole Earth Catalog has also played out in the 
broader social and political landscape of the American West (Kirk 2007), and subsequently, the 
New West 2.0. Capitalism has made materialism and consumption part of the American way of 
life since its origins, but that lifestyle is at odds with the notion that it is the job of individuals 
and their government to protect the environment. Brand thus believed that technological 
innovation was the best antidote to the tension between consumption and government-controlled 
industrialization (Kirk 2008). The Bay Area of the American West seemingly embraces this 
green ethos today, along with support for a left-right blend of states’ rights and libertarian 
politics (Kirk 2007). Traditional accounts of New West development in the academic literature 
on the subject are well-aligned with this new brand of environmentalism: visions of stylish 
hipsters in coffee shops, outdoor enthusiasts clad in Patagonia gear, and tech-obsessed young 
adults wearing their computers on their wrists are popular characterizations within New West 
scholarship (Kirk 2008). The importance of these characterizations is that they have resulted in 
the embrace of ‘green capitalism’ and ‘green consumerism’ (Rome 2017) by businesses and 
individuals in the latest version of the American West. As I will explain, the way Facebook and 
Apple operate their data centers provides a good example of this new sustainable enterprise 
approach. 
In essence, green capitalism aims to find a technological solution to the problem that 
arises as capitalism requires endless growth within a finite resource base (Rome 2017). This 
philosophy is very much aligned with Brand’s countercultural visions for the future because it 
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suggests that technology can and should be used ‘appropriately,’ or in a manner that is less 
harmful to the environment while still allowing for business growth (Kirk 2008). Of course, 
greening capitalism is first and foremost a business opportunity because it is a “marketing claim 
and a fashion, a reaction to changing markets;” but it is also “a result of generational change” 
because the CEOs now in charge have been influenced by the environmental movement and are 
presumably at least slightly more concerned about the environmental impacts of industrial 
operations (Berghoff 2017, p. 27). This is evident in Silicon Valley-founded tech companies like 
Facebook and Apple. Here, activism is not about marching in a protest through the streets of a 
city, rather it is buying eco-friendly goods and developing ‘sustainable’ technology and 
production methods (Kirk 2008). This is the “middle ground between capitalism and 
environmentalism” (Kirk 2008, p. 291), precisely where big data companies reside. 
 The counterculture faded over time, but Brand’s vision of appropriate technology (AT) 
and green technology have recently found new life with the rise of ecomodernism (Asafu-Adjaye 
et al. 2015). The ecomodernism movement is synonymous with ecological modernization, a 
school of thought that supports green capitalism and sustainable development (Isenhour 2016). 
Ecomodernists believe that decoupling economic growth from resource extraction and use is 
necessary to combat climate change, and that this is achieved through creating more sustainable 
technology (Hayden 2014, p. 4). In other words, the ultimate goal is to reduce human 
dependence on the living natural environment via technological development (Isenhour 2016).  
 One group that supports this ethos is The Breakthrough Institute, a Bay Area-centered 
environmental think tank. The institute is a group of ecomodernists seeking to alter “the way 
people think about energy and the environment to meet the global challenges of the 21st century” 
(Breakthrough Institute 2016) and, in some ways, the organization has becoming the leading 
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popularizer of ecomodernist ideas. The Institute developed a controversial document in 2015 
called The Ecomoderist Manifesto. This manifesto, also signed by Stewart Brand, highlights the 
importance of technological development as a primary means of mitigating the deleterious 
effects of climate change. The signers assert that “knowledge and technology, applied with 
wisdom, might allow for a good, or even great, Anthropocene” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, p. 6). 
The authors are certain that technological development with sustainability in mind will cancel 
out any negative impacts industrial capitalism has had on the environment. The document also 
fittingly contains statements reminiscent of the Wise Use movement of the 1990s, as the authors 
call for “using resources more productively” and for us to “seek to liberate the environment from 
the economy” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015, p. 18). So, unlike most environmentalists, 
ecomodernists contend that modernization and development are crucial to climate change 
mitigation. To them, modernization results in “vastly improved material well-being, public 
health, resource productivity, economic integration, shared infrastructure, and personal freedom” 
(Adjaye et al. 2015, p. 28). The Ecomodernist Manifesto is therefore the epitome of the green 
capitalism trend: we can, and should, modernize and grow the economy—as long as it is done in 
a way that is environmentally responsible. 
 The manifesto advocates five key aspects of ecomodernism: (1) economic growth must 
be decoupled from environmental impacts, (2) technology is the primary solution to 
environmental degradation, (3) human development can and will continue as long as appropriate 
technology is used to support this development, (4) the transition to using more renewable 
sources of energy must happen soon and rapidly, and (5) ‘wild’ nature must be protected for its 
deep aesthetic and emotional value. These five tenants and the associated political undertones of 
the manifesto are directly aligned with the green ethos present in Silicon Valley and the New 
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West 2.0, as they are visible in the way that tech companies there operate. According to 
ecomodernists and green capitalism/consumerism, no one needs to give up their cell phone or 
computer to be an environmentalist; engineers simply have to work to design them more 
responsibly, with sustainability in mind (Berghoff 2017). This confidence our ability to continue 
capitalism and consumption in a sustainable manner represents the foundation of big data 
companies like Facebook and Apple. As the next section will discuss, the companies’ business 
models and statements by their founders and managers are clearly in support of the 
ecomodernism movement’s five basic principles—manifested in data center operations—even if 
they do not overtly say so. 
 
It’s Easy Being Green? 
Ecomodernism is seductive. According to ecomodernists, companies and society as a whole can 
achieve sustainability through technological innovation and wise business practices. Moreover, 
the recent trend in green capitalism and subsequent rise in sustainable enterprise have made 
corporations realize the competitive advantage initiatives like Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) can now give their businesses (Wirtenberg et al. 2009). In brief, CSR involves a 
corporation voluntarily taking action to support stakeholders’ needs and values in its pursuit of 
profit, which also includes considerations for environmental health (Hartman et al. 2007; 
Coombs and Holladay 2012). Adopting CSR strategies is beneficial because in theory, doing so 
minimizes negative human and environmental health impacts of business operations, while also 
maximizing profits and positive public image (Ingenhoff and Sommer 2011). As such, 
ecomodernism and the green capitalism it inspires offer a win-win for most companies: they can 
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be stewards of the environment and please stakeholders, while also enjoying profits from their 
sustainability-related investments.  
Big data companies like Facebook and Apple have followed this trend with their 
investments in green energy and attention to their employees’ and local communities’ well-
being. As noted in previous chapters, Facebook in particular has begun to support renewable 
energy projects, while also helping strengthen local infrastructure of the towns where they are 
building their data centers (Facebook Sustainability 2017). The green capitalist, ecomodernist 
tendencies of Facebook and Apple are easy to see in statements made by various leaders of their 
organizations. For example, when President Trump announced that the U.S. would withdraw 
from the 2015 Paris Climate agreement last year, Facebook Founder Mark Zuckerberg posted on 
Facebook: 
Withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement is bad for the environment, bad for 
the economy, and it puts our children's future at risk. For our part, we've 
committed that every new data center we build will be powered by 100% 
renewable energy. Stopping climate change is something we can only do as a 
global community, and we have to act together before it's too late.2 
 
In Zuckerberg’s statement, the connections to ecomodernism and green capitalism are clear. He 
mentions the importance of considering the economy and the environment (not either-or), as well 
as renewable energy investments and community support. Such statements are not uncommon 
for Zuckerberg. He boldly discussed climate change and renewable energy in his 
Commencement Address at Harvard University in May 2017 (Harvard Gazette 2017). Facebook 
also has several people working as part of its ‘sustainability team’ that have made similar 
statements about the company’s progress towards mitigating their environmental impact. 
 Likewise, Apple’s CEO Tim Cook has spoken overtly about the need to conduct business 
in a sustainable manner. As noted in the introduction of this chapter, he too spoke out against 
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President Trump’s decision on the Paris Agreement, but to no avail (Bell 2017). Cook has also 
done numerous interviews on Apple’s sustainability initiatives. In an interview with Forbes, he 
stated, “We also try to change the world by the way we run the company… [we are] very 
focused on the environment and making sure that we have a no-carbon footprint, essentially, or 
running our company on 100% renewable energy…We advocate for human rights…we believe 
that education is a great equalizer”.
3 These sort of statements make a lot of sense based on the 
fact that Apple was founded by Steve Jobs in the 1970s, under the same guiding principles as the 
Whole Earth Catalog (Dormehl 2014). Accordingly, Cook ended his Forbes interview by saying 
that Apple “will always try to change the world for the better. That was the motivation behind 
creating Apple when it was created back in the ’70s. And it’s still the motivation today…we 
want to do what’s right, not what’s easy.” 
 Yet, being green for these companies has arguably been relatively easy from a monetary 
standpoint. While it may have posed a financial risk initially, they have certainly profited from 
their sustainability investments since they began their greening efforts (Facebook Sustainability 
2017). Facebook and Apple have evidently taken the lead on sustainable enterprise in the tech 
industry and have subsequently formed a coalition with other tech giants to put millions of 
dollars toward climate change mitigation efforts (Lapowsky 2015). Furthermore, the latest 
updates to their data centers are perhaps the most important development in their sustainability 
initiatives in recent years. They have followed the core tenants of ecomodernism. As the case of 
Prineville shows, data centers are the embodiment of green capitalism and ecomodernism’s 
influence on data companies.  
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Making Data Great Again 
The way Facebook and Apple data centers are constructed and how they operate supports most 
of the five basic tenants of ecomoderism. Evidently, data centers are the physical infrastructure 
that supports our ability to use and embrace individualized technology. The companies that run 
data centers have become big businesses that decouple economic growth from environmental 
impacts (the first tenant) by embracing green technology (the second tenant), obtaining 
environmental certifications like LEED for their buildings, and creating calculable metrics for 
their resource usage.4 They are also rapidly investing in local renewable energy sources as they 
build up and expand their data campuses (the fourth tenant). Consequently, while their 
operations and physical footprint continues to grow, the spread of data centers is certainly less 
devastating for local ecosystems than a strip mine or another resource-intensive industry might 
be. They are therefore developing land to support data centers—the buildings that support 
appropriate technology—but in what appears to be a relatively ecologically safe way (the third 
tenant). It is therefore clear data centers exhibit the first four tenants, but the fifth tenant, a 
valuation of ‘wild nature,’ is harder to identify. Nevertheless, in Prineville at least, Facebook has 
donated millions to support outdoor recreation locally, suggesting that the company values 
nature for purposes beyond technological development. 
 
   The tenants of ecomodernism collectively indicate that there are essentially two main 
important components that make technology promising: its potential for achieving more 
sustainable modes of industrial capitalism, and its increasingly small-scale, individualized nature 
(Kirk 2007). Data centers fulfill both of these promises thanks to the latest trends set by 
Facebook and Apple. As noted in the introduction of this work, most data centers are not known 
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for being very environmentally-friendly, and have even been cited for contributing to climate 
change (e.g. Cubitt et al. 2011; Greenpeace 2017). Acting in response to these accusations, 
Facebook and Apple have outwardly solved the sustainability problem data centers posed 
through their attempts to green data center operations via investments in renewable energy and 
innovative engineering. These corporate-owned data storage warehouses are also maintaining the 
privatization of data rather than allowing such information to become solely government-
controlled. This is reflective of the countercultural desire to place faith in corporations and the 
individuals that run them rather than trusting a domineering, central governing body with our 
data. Furthermore, data centers are the heart of the infrastructure that allows our favorite 
individualized technologies to exist (i.e. phones, laptops, tablets, etc.). Without them, social 
media platforms like Facebook would not have been possible. What is more, the case study of 
Prineville suggests that Facebook and Apple will simultaneously empower small rural 
communities by boosting their economy and contribute to local events and infrastructure, rather 
than take these towns for granted. 
It is, however, important to point out that efforts by powerful companies like Facebook 
and Apple, while certainly beneficial to the local environment and communities in which their 
data centers reside, are also part of a business plan. Big data companies are good capitalists, and 
being green is a very good business strategy right now. They know how to make money and they 
take advantage of situations that they can essentially guarantee will help their business. But does 
this mean that data centers are built with solely malicious motives? Are they any worse than any 
other industry that might move in to similar towns? Based on my research thus far, it is very hard 
to say. Certainly at the local level, big data companies seem to be doing less harm than good, 
which is an encouraging and surprising revelation. 
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The previous two chapters noted how, despite my preconceived notions of social media 
and computer companies paving over small rural towns, it has become clear to me that the many 
citizens of Prineville consider the Facebook and Apple data centers positive economically, 
socially, and environmentally. It appears that the big data companies have in fact taken into 
account all three elements of sustainability. That said, relative to environmental impacts at the 
local scale, Facebook has been less successful in using renewable energy in Prineville than 
elsewhere. According to company spokesmen, that is primarily due to site constraints, not 
because the company is uninterested in investing in renewables. Central Oregon is powered 
mainly by PacifiCorp, an energy company whose officials admitted that their current energy mix 
primarily relies upon coal and natural gas. PacifiCorp does, however, have plans to greatly 
increase the amount of renewable energy in their mix by 2020. Facebook responded to such 
constraints by publicly fighting for the Voluntary Renewable Energy Tariff (VRET) to show that 
they are trying their best to promote environmentally-friendly business practices in Prineville. 
Moreover, they have helped fund many local community improvement and educational projects.  
One such project was the enormous new wetlands area Prineville developed to help with 
wastewater treatment (City of Prineville 2016). This project is a certainly a wise investment for 
Facebook and Apple. It fosters a more positive image of the companies in the minds of Prineville 
residents, while also boosting their competitive advantage over other green businesses 
worldwide. Yet it is also beneficial for the Prineville community because it has reduced the data 
centers’ impact on local ecosystems, has saved the town an enormous sum of money in 
infrastructural improvements, and has resulted in a new outdoor recreational area available for 
use by visitors and residents (City of Prineville 2017). Clearly the sustainability of data centers is 
more nuanced than I originally imagined, especially when considering their investments in 
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almost all aspects of community life in Prineville. The ecomodernist way of conducting business 
outwardly has many benefits for stakeholders involved, but there are still things about data 
centers worth problematizing. 
  
Changing the Game 
 
With the natural resources economy dwindling, the investment of these data 
centers in our economic infrastructure, their contributions have really been a 
game-changer for our little town. 
—Cole Kent, Crook County Chamber of Commerce  
 
It is important to examine big data companies’ embrace of ecomodernism and sustainability 
critically. Their motivation for taking part in the ecomodernist movement makes sense based on 
Facebook and Apple’s connections to Silicon Valley’s green ethos, but there are surely other 
motivating factors involved. This section aims to show how ecomodernism is likely not the sole 
force influencing the actions of these Silicon Valley-based corporations. This is an important 
consideration to make because it prevents the acceptance of a certain power dynamic that has 
developed and continued without question. 
Big data companies are corporations that construct consent for their existence in small 
rural communities by highlighting their positive qualities while casually not addressing their 
negative ones. For many of the residents of Prineville, the data center appears to have been an 
entirely positive addition to their community. As local official Pete Stenner put it, “Facebook has 
been nothing but stellar in terms of community involvement…Their outreach and their grants 
have been a huge deal.” And indeed, they have. As of spring 2017, Facebook had donated $1.2 
million to the town beginning in 2011, primarily in the form of grants to support local schools, 
research, and sports (City of Prineville 2017—Fact Sheet). After my interview with Stenner, I 
visited a softball field near the Prineville high school at his request. He wanted me to see how 
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proud and thankful the town was for Facebook and Apple’s help. When I arrived at the high 
school, I found a Facebook sign displayed prominently underneath the scoreboard, advertising 
the company’s contributions to all who attend softball games (Figure 16). Stenner informed me 
that there were more signs around town marking Facebook’s donations, but they must have been 
located in less obvious places or had been taken down. Nevertheless, it was clear to me that 
Facebook likes to demonstrate its support for various local endeavors, and local officials are 
happy to oblige. 
 
 
Figure 16. Facebook sign overlooking a softball field near Crook 
County High School in Prineville, Oregon. Photo by author. 
 
 Due to their financial aid to the community, many Prineville residents—officials in 
particular—view the data centers with an almost worshipful appreciation and respect. Stenner 
went so far as to say, “We have a new school, a new hospital. We have these things that at the 
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end of the day, if they [the data centers] hadn’t arrived, we wouldn’t have them. They gave the 
community the hope, the ability to ponder their future and get behind the movement forward.” 
Facebook is hence seen as heroic for having lifted this dying timber town out of the economic 
depression (Streep 2017). Although the building resides high on the hill above the town, 
seemingly isolated from residents, a top local official, Beth Robins, asserts that “they have been 
extremely good neighbors,” helping her and other officials keep Prineville and its unique rural-
Western charm alive by blending into the community fabric rather than tearing it apart. 
Consequently, it seems the residents of Prineville are more than willing to allow Facebook to 
continue to use the land, energy, and water that perhaps could have gone to other local 
operations. It appears a small price to pay for all the benefits the company brings to the local 
community.  
Yet why exactly do big data companies care about the residents of Prineville? Is it simply 
because these people happen to be living in a town that has a favorable climate for data center 
operations, and because the city gave them generous tax breaks and access to relatively cheap 
land, water, and energy? Perhaps if Prineville had been a dying rural town elsewhere in America, 
Facebook would not have given them a second glance. It is true that there has been a notable 
increase in uneven development with regards to the internet, since some communities, rural or 
otherwise, are simply better geographically suited to adopt Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) industries (Whitacre and Mills 2007). In the rural American West, for 
example, communities that have been able to survive the transition from extractive to service-
based economies in the New West have integrated updated technology and the associated 
infrastructure (Robbins 2005). Those towns that are left to struggle remain reliant upon the dying 
extractive industries because they lack the ability and funds to construct the internet 
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infrastructure that would be required for data center operations (Whitacre and Mills 2007). It is 
important to note that in both the tourism and technology industries for instance, uneven 
geography is often apparently a result of comparative advantages (Hogan 2015). That is, a place 
must be optimally located to support a given industry. As such, the cities and towns that are able 
to succeed in a digital economy have geographic advantages that make them more readily able to 
adapt to technological infrastructure and thus more attractive to ICT business in general. 
Here it is worth describing what scholars have deemed the ‘digital divide,’ a concept that 
exposes such uneven geographies (e.g. Malecki 2003; Aquili and Moghaddam 2007; Whitacre 
and Mills 2007). The idea of a ‘digital divide’ was originally used to describe how rural regions 
tend to be slower or unable to adopt innovations in ICT due to their remoteness and low-density 
populations (Whitacre and Mills 2007). However, some studies suggest that despite the fact that 
it can be more difficult to create technological infrastructure to support less densely populated 
areas, whether or not people have internet now has less to do with where they live 
geographically, and more to do with income and education levels (Malecki 2003). Although the 
existence of a digital divide is therefore somewhat contested amongst scholars (Aquili and 
Moghaddam 2007), the term is still useful to point out the implications this digital age has for 
overcoming spatial barriers. When a rural community does receive internet access and 
technological infrastructure, it certainly shatters spatial divisions between the rural and the urban 
in not only a real sense, but also a virtual one.  
The importance of these new digital and spatial connections are that they have made 
capital more mobile than ever before. The mobility of capital means that most businesses can 
now locate in many different, as long as they can conduct business remotely, and the locations 
are desirable to those who work for a given company (Riebsame et al. 1997). Consequently, 
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mobile capital also increases the likelihood that rural towns like Prineville feel the pressure to 
compete with their urban counterparts for a place in the digital economy, incentivizing the rural 
entrepreneurialism, as discussed in chapter two. As the recent scramble by cities to get Amazon 
headquarters to locate in their communities shows (Selyukh 2017), leaders have been made 
aware of the apparent promise big tech companies can bring. It is no surprise then that Prineville 
and other small towns that have been decimated as a result of economic decline are fighting to 
win over big data companies such as Facebook, Apple and Amazon. Towns like Prineville have 
come to realize that the technology industry may be their last hope for a vital economy, largely 
as a result of globalization. That gives big data companies a lot of power. 
  
So what can be said about other rural communities that do not have broadband or easy 
access to cheap land and resources? Unfortunately, big data companies probably will not pay 
much attention to them. Prineville officials noted that Facebook considered other similar towns 
for their first data center, but the town leaders made Prineville look good enough to be the 
‘chosen one’ by offering generous tax breaks and access to cheap land, water, and energy. It is 
clear who has the power in this relationship. Facebook, like Amazon, makes itself look so 
enticing that towns are vying for their attention, hoping to be the tech giant’s next charity project. 
Oddly enough, residents seem to know this subconsciously, but they also do not seem to care. As 
one of Prineville’s historians, Sean Leibers, put it with a shrug, Facebook and Apple are “just 
taking advantage of what is being given to them as far as benefits, and that is one of the reasons 
they are located here [in Prineville]. Otherwise they would go somewhere else that did give them 
a big [tax] break.”  
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Leibers’ statement is most certainly true. Again, Facebook and Apple are at the core, 
private corporations that need to make money to stay afloat in this globalized economy—and 
they hold a lot of power because of the success they have had in doing so. The massive amount 
of sway Facebook and Apple have in our everyday lives is astounding. We let Facebook filter 
out news, creating a personal bubble of customized information that can shield us from the things 
the computer thinks we do not want to see (Pariser 2011). We wear Apple on our wrists, letting 
them track our heart beat, or put them in our pocket, while our location is broadcast to unknown 
people in unknown places. We consent to big data companies’ existence and power every time 
we log on to their websites and plug into their devices (Foer 2016). And their use of the cloud 
metaphor makes matters even more confusing because it singularizes data centers as a solitary 
white object in the sky (Carruth 2014; Hu 2015). How could a harmless mass of water vapor hurt 
humans and the environment? Most would say it could not. A woman living in Prineville told me 
that she figured “everything just disappears [in the cloud] when I post. I never even thought 
about it.” She, like most people who use social media and the cloud, has been assured that her 
information is safe with Facebook or Apple, stored somewhere high in the sky where no one can 
reach it. This too gives big data companies power because it prevents people from questioning 
what real world impacts their data demands could be having in the long-term. 
Yet big data companies are not necessarily using all this power irresponsibly. While it is 
true that other towns have been (and will be) left behind by the tech industry, those that are able 
to attract them to their area certainly do not suffer for their efforts. Prineville is a case-in-point. 
There is no denying that accepting data centers’ presence is easy when Facebook and Apple do 
everything they can to tread lightly on the towns where they choose to build. They blend in 
surprisingly well, even in a place where high-tech industrial operations have never taken place. 
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So, despite all the commotion about their community contributions amongst local officials, on a 
day-to-day basis, it is easy for residents of Prineville to forget the data centers even exist. Cole 
Kent from Crook County Chamber of Commerce said that fairly often, visitors will come to 
Prineville and not even know the data centers are there until someone tells them about the 
buildings. After all, most people do not come to Prineville to see data centers—and from a 
distance, they look like any other industrial warehouse. The buildings are also not open to the 
public for tours, as I quickly found out when I traveled to Oregon. And, as local official Evan 
Kasey, put it, “As compared to a community without data centers, the average person might 
know a bit more [about the cloud]. But then again, does the average person really care where 
their material is? They just want their pictures to come up when they need them.” As such, even 
if people are aware of where the data centers are, they seemingly have little influence on local 
residents’ everyday lives—and that is just fine with them, so long as they can still post their 
selfies on Facebook. 
Taken as a whole, what all of this suggests is that the American West is very much 
immersed in the light-green society, and data centers allow it to be possible. Prineville residents 
likely do not want to consider any negative environmental impacts of data centers, but nor would 
they accept an industry that posed a threat to their cherished historical roots. The town itself, 
housing data centers and hosting rodeos all at once, is reflective of this unwillingness to choose 
between modern and traditional and environmentalism and technology. Prineville too, has thus 
taken the middle path; but it was ecomodernist companies like Facebook and Apple that took 
their hand and led them. Whether or not this was for financial reasons or due to the influence of 
Silicon Valley green ethos perhaps does not matter. Both Prineville and the tech industry giants it 
now hosts have struck a balance. 
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Wrapping Up: Unpacking the Green Box 
Evidently, it is challenging to unpack the true sustainability of data centers. It is clear that this 
physical infrastructure, while hidden in plain sight by cloud metaphors, is central to the 
maintenance of big data companies’ power. Data centers are quite literally the heart of our 
technological obsession. But because their greenness is promoted by Facebook, Apple, and 
others in the tech industry, we are convinced we need not worry about demanding increasingly 
large amounts of data storage space. Data centers seem to be helping local communities by 
aiding in their economic and social development. They also appear to be environmentally 
friendly because of their investments in renewable energy and the green visions put forth by the 
CEOs of the top tech industry leaders. So, with their overt efforts at addressing the social, 
environmental, and economic components of sustainability, no one wants to or needs to question 
the influence big data companies have globally. Big data companies cloaked themselves behind a 
green curtain.  
 Yet because these companies are rooted in a countercultural ecomodernist brand of 
environmentalism, they have worked to achieve a form of sustainability that, like the light-green 
society, remains largely ambiguous. For instance, although Facebook has certainly set a 
wonderful example by investing in renewable energy, one cannot be entirely sure how ‘green’ 
their energy sources truly are. As previously mentioned, the leading power supply company for 
Central Oregon, PacifiCorp, gets the majority of their energy from coal and natural gas. These 
are certainly not renewable and sustainable sources of power, especially considering the evident 
contribution of fossil fuels to global climate change. Moreover, as noted in chapter three, 
Facebook has not released any information regarding their electronic waste (e-waste) recycling 
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and/or disposal. E-waste also poses social and environmental justice concerns (e.g. BAN 2002) 
that would certainly taint Facebook’s image if they are indeed taking part in toxic dumping, even 
if it may be unknowingly. The bold statements made by Facebook and Apple CEOs about their 
green efforts are thus perhaps not quite as well-founded as they appear. 
 Nevertheless, their attempts to operate even somewhat sustainably is commendable. Big 
data companies are trying to ameliorate the environmental harm their operations could 
potentially cause, while also promoting more data consumption among users. Data centers are 
thus certainly evidence that the ambivalent light-green society is still thriving today. They are the 
result of our desire to be able to go outside and enjoy nature, while also taking pictures of our 
adventures with our cell phones and storing those memories safely in the ephemeral cloud. 
Because of data centers, we have the ability to balance these two outwardly conflicting desires. 
Ecomodernist companies such as Facebook and Apple have made this possible by constructing 
consent to build data centers in small rural towns worldwide. These data centers are a digital 
variant of the light-green society. 
Notes 
1. The Breakthrough Institute is, as defined on their website, “a global research center that 
identifies and promotes technological solutions to environmental and human 
development challenges.” See https://thebreakthrough.org/about for more information on 
the mission of the institute, as well as those involved and their various publications. 
 
2. Statement excerpted from Kurt Wagner, “Mark Zuckerberg says Donald Trump’s 
decision on the Paris agreement ‘puts our children’s future at risk’,” Recode, June 1, 
2017, https://www.recode.net/2017/6/1/15727122/mark-zuckerberg-trump-paris-
agreement-statement. 
 
3. The full interview is available at http://fortune.com/2017/09/11/apple-tim-cook-
education-health-care/. 
 
4. These metrics include Water Usage Efficiency (WUE), Power Usage Efficiency (PUE), 
and others. See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion of the environmental 
initiatives of big data companies. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
PINNING IT DOWN 
 
When I returned to New York after my month-long stay in Oregon, I discovered there was still 
much more to learn about data centers online. One morning I was looking for information about 
the Prineville Facebook data center’s energy use, and I thought I should see if they had listed any 
information on the internet. I discovered that there were Facebook pages dedicated to each of the 
company’s data centers, as well as one entitled “Green on Facebook,”1 which discusses 
Facebook’s sustainability measures and related information. As I recorded the data from these 
pages in a Word document, I thought I ought to save my work somewhere other than on the USB 
flash drive that held my entire thesis project. I did not know what I would do if I lost it. So, I 
decided to put everything onto my online Google Drive account. As I watched the little blue 
wheel spin at the bottom of my screen, I began laughing, realizing the irony of my actions: I was 
uploading my thesis project to the cloud, to the cloud, and using the internet and Facebook itself 
to gather more data about these very things. 
 Yet, I suppose that irony helps display one of the points I have made in this project. We 
are in fact, very reliant upon big data companies today. I want my personal documents to be 
accessible anywhere, at any time. I trust the virtual space of the cloud more than a personal, 
physical hard drive or flash drive. The cloud is untouchable to me and others, even though, as a 
result of my research I know that the cloud is very much a physical space too. Data centers are 
well-hidden in plain sight. Without a second thought, we put our information into the cloud, 
trusting big data companies with photos of ourselves and our precious documents. 
 In this thesis, I have sought to catch the ethereal cloud and pin it down. I have pinned it 
down in three ways. First, to identify and examine the geography of data centers. I found where 
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many are located and have speculated as to why they are located there. Second, to pin down and 
survey their social and environmental consequences. I discovered the minimal negative impacts 
on the local scale, and the potentially large negative impacts at the global scale. And third, to 
examine how these digital storage campuses fit into the sustainability visions of Silicon Valley 
tech companies such as Facebook and Apple. But, as the following sections discuss, despite my 
efforts to catch the cloud and pin it down, much about data centers remains elusive.  
  
The Data on Data Centers 
 
Based on the first chapter of this work, data centers appear heroic and almost entirely beneficial 
to community life, especially to small rural towns. It is certainly true that big data companies 
have saved Prineville from having to make the ‘devil’s bargain’ that their neighboring town 
Bend has made. Hal Rothman’s (1998) ideas about tourism having destroyed cultures across 
American West and worldwide are currently inapplicable to data centers’ presence in their host 
communities. Like the tourism industry, big data companies improve the local economy; yet they 
do so in a way that does not erase preexisting community values and characteristics—at least in 
the short-term. Facebook and Apple have nearly single-handedly lifted Prineville out of an 
economic depression (City of Prineville 2017), and presumably can do so for other small rural 
towns in other similar locations (O’Connor 2017). Facebook and Apple make it clear that data 
centers can indeed improve the economy in small rural towns, despite being unable to replace the 
much larger number of jobs provided by traditional extractive industries.  
In this particular case study of Prineville, data centers appear to have minimal socio-
cultural implications. Facebook has made efforts to blend into the cultural fabric of Prineville 
and other towns in which it has constructed data centers. For example, the first manager 
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Facebook hired in Prineville grew up on a ranch in a nearby town and allegedly knew several of 
the local officials prior to taking the position (Streep 2017). Prineville officials also assert that 
Facebook attempts to hire locals as much as possible, and 75 percent of their employees are in 
fact residents of Crook County (City of Prineville 2017). Of course, this is 75 percent of a small 
number of employees, but it is impressively high, especially in a town with a relatively low 
population. As such, the shifts visible in the physical and cultural landscape of the neighboring 
town Bend, as a result of tourism, are not noticeably present in Prineville right now. While it is 
true that there are a few brewpubs and chain restaurants in town, Prineville’s history and 
traditions (e.g. parades, rodeos, etc.) remain prevalent in the community. This would suggest that 
no devil’s bargain has been made as a result of Prineville’s acceptance of big data companies’ 
support. Furthermore, these conclusions make clear that the conceptions of a New West, at least 
in this case, are outdated. Prineville is a hybridized mix of Old and New, a delicate balance 
between two different ways of life that are, at least for now, able to coexist. A New West 2.0 has 
begun to emerge in parts of the rural American West. 
Yet still, aside from economic improvements and socio-cultural blending, there are less 
prominent aspects of data centers that are quite disconcerting. While their investments in 
renewable energy sources and alleged minimal environmental impacts on the local scale are 
commendable, how much better will these companies truly be for the environment than other 
industries, especially in the long term and at broader scales? Regardless of the source of the 
power and water these companies draw from, they are using up increasingly larger amounts of 
resources to maintain the ever-expanding cloud. And these operations are only intensifying. Each 
week it seems there are headlines in local newspapers about expansion of preexisting data 
campuses or completely new data center construction. Even Prineville’s data centers have 
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expanded multiple times, and they announced the purchase of 540 million acres of county land in 
December 2017 for further data center construction over the next four years (Quintana 2017). 
The footprint of data centers is growing such that they will certainly be taking up more land 
space and natural resources, which puts a greater demand on local infrastructure. Whether or not 
this increased load—renewably sourced or not—will prove to be harmful at any scale remains to 
be seen. 
 Furthermore, the issue of electronic waste (e-waste) deserves a closer examination. If big 
data companies are willing to boast openly about their green initiatives, why have they remained 
silent about e-waste? Most of them seem to think that sustainability is achieved merely through a 
reduction in their carbon emissions. Yet sustainability encompasses much more than that. The 
companies’ lack of communication about e-waste makes it appear as if they do not take 
responsibility for the enormous amount of e-waste they surely generate, including used servers, 
broken server parts, wires, and computers. Employees themselves seem to have little idea what 
happens to e-waste from their own data centers. However, based on the research conducted by 
NGOs to date, we can be certain that e-waste is a serious global environmental justice problem 
that must be given the public attention it deserves (BAN 2002). Big data companies’ silence is 
worrisome, as they may very well be contributing to such global injustices. Scholars can surely 
play an important role in exposing and addressing issues surrounding data center e-waste, as 
information will hopefully become available in coming years. 
As such, the true sustainability of such large-scale operations warrants questioning. It is 
hard to determine their ultimate level of sustainability with such a dearth of reliable information 
available to the public; however, no matter how small or large the ecological ‘footprint’ of each 
individual data center is, the aggregate total land space and resources they consume will continue 
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to expand as demand for data storage space increases and new types data-intensive media are 
developed (e.g. 360-degree photos and video and virtual and augmented reality) (Sverdlik 2017). 
As data centers grow in size and number, they will necessarily require more land, energy, and 
water—and they will generate more waste. So, perhaps it is true that big data are not as bad for 
local ecosystems as some other industries may be, but considering the industry’s exponential 
growth rate and probable contributions to the global e-waste problem, big data may not be as 
good and green as Facebook and others make it out to be. It is impossible to say for certain what 
the environmental outcome will be if big data companies are not more forthcoming with 
measurements of their sustainability. 
 
As I explained in chapter four, it is not just the companies casting their operations as 
‘green’ that clouds our perception of cloud usage; the cloud metaphor itself plays a large part in 
making it seem as if our data fetish has no impact on the environment. Data centers are very 
much physical structures that metabolize nature, but big data companies are able to use green 
energy investments and the illusion that the cloud is a virtual, boundless space to prevent anyone 
from questioning their true sustainability. Many corporations and people, including myself, have 
become dependent on the cloud to store the data they value most. This dependency is gives big 
data companies a lot of power. By using their services daily, we allow big data companies the 
ability to further control our information, as well as certain aspects of our lives (Foer 2017). Yet 
whether or not this is something to fear is made unclear by the unmistakable positive 
contributions big data companies like Facebook and Apple have made to local communities and 
the surrounding environment. With their green visions and adherence to econmodernist tenants, 
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these companies have helped continue the trend toward a greener version of capitalism—if such 
a thing is indeed possible. 
So, perhaps one could conclude that cloud infrastructure is indeed better characterized as 
an example of what Michael Bess (2003) has deemed the ‘light-green society.’ Aspects of 
environmentalism and technological modernism are clearly now coexisting in places like 
Prineville, as Facebook and Apple make technology and data storage as environmentally-friendly 
and socio-economically beneficial as possible at a local scale. This odd balance between 
environmental concern and technological fetishism, and an ambivalence toward modern versus 
traditional, seems to be the most probable future for many communities of the developed world 
(Bess 2003, p. 237). If this is true, the story I have told is one with a precariously happy ending. 
Prineville and big data companies are now sewn together in a peculiar patchwork quilt of 
traditional rural Western ways of life and the urban-based rapid development of modern ICT and 
New West culture. The New West 2.0 conceptualization is one that helps reveal the multifaceted 
nature of these changing landscapes big data companies have created by building data centers 
and ‘updating’ small rural towns: they have become at once modern, traditional, ecological, and 
technological.  
As a whole, towns that Facebook and others have approached with a business deal have 
rightfully welcomed data centers (Steer 2017). Presumably, these towns’ eagerness is at least in 
part due to the alleged success of data center construction in towns like Prineville (O’Connor 
2017). Again, because this construction is ongoing and continual however, it is hard to say 
whether Henrico County, Los Lunas, Papillion, and other towns will strike the same balance with 
big data companies as Prineville has been able to. Because Prineville is located in the rural 
American West, a place generalized as one having gone through constant changes over time 
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(Taylor 2004), it could conceivably be better suited to adapt to data centers in a way that 
preserves their cherished community character. Then again, maybe this balance is made possible 
simply due to the fact that Facebook is making such a concerted effort to blend in with (and not 
necessarily take over) the communities near to their data centers—at least for the time being. 
Perhaps it is possible for a high tech company to stitch itself neatly into the fabric of any rural 
community. 
 
Data Centers Down the Road 
 
Over time, the impacts of data centers will certainly change, and there is no guarantee that the 
hidden aspects of data center operation are entirely sustainable (e.g. electronic waste and the 
physical footprint of data centers). Data centers certainly metabolize nature in their consumption 
of land, water, and energy, regardless of how ‘green’ their model of capitalism is. And this 
metabolism will probably be increasingly intense in the near future, as the operations of big data 
companies expand. Moreover, although data centers are not necessarily sites of production 
and/or consumption, they do allow those actions to occur and they act as an instrument of 
information transmission, as data is shared and sold. They are key in producing digital space, 
acting like warehouses rather than factories. It is therefore true that even in the case of data 
centers, “industrial environments often entail uncontested power over massive flows of raw 
materials, energy, and waste” (Huber 2017, p. 151)—and now, information could be added to 
this list of flows. As such, there is a need to politicize industrial sites, including data centers, so 
everyone think critically about the real-world impacts of our increasingly digital lives in this 
capitalistic society. However, data centers are currently not political in a negative sense. In fact, 
companies like Facebook and Apple have empowered some small communities, including 
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Prineville, making them more viable in the digital age. Of course, there are still some less 
fortunate communities that are geographically ill-suited for data center operations that will be 
overlooked by big data companies. There is an apparent limit to the extent of their charity. 
Still, in Prineville at least, residents seem convinced that Facebook has done only good 
things for their community—which outwardly, it has. There is no denying the economic 
improvements Facebook and Apple helped create for Prineville.2 But there is also no denying 
that company has used, and will continue to use, the town’s resources and land-space, no matter 
how much renewable legislation they may push for. Data centers are far from stagnant, and they 
will continue to grow in size and number (Hogan 2013). Yet as with many other industries, the 
implications of such growth are hidden behind the ‘veil of capitalism’ (Brooks and Bryant, 
2014)—which now perhaps could be deemed the veil of green capitalism. There is no way to say 
with certainty whether or not everything Facebook and Apple do is for the sake of profit or if it is 
for the sake of economic, social, and environmental components of sustainability. Most likely, it 
is a combination of both because when it comes to green capitalism, these companies come out 
on top either way. How many companies (for which it is feasible) would choose not to profit 
from sustainability investments? Probably not many. 
So for now, Prineville remains honored to have the data companies there. Facebook and 
Apple have seemingly done nothing but help the town regain its economic vitality in a way that 
appears to be economically sustainable, especially considering the growth of the technology 
industry (and our data fetish) in recent years. There is no question that Prineville needed to shift 
its economic base. Because they did not want to turn to tourism like their neighboring town 
Bend, something else needed to take the place of the timber industry. Based on the limited 
number of jobs data centers create, however, the town has still not found a total solution. 
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Nonetheless, the ‘game-changing’ tech companies have been enough to get the town out of an 
economic depression. As a result, regardless of the data companies’ motivations, they have 
struck a balance with the town—at least for the time being. For now, leaders of Prineville and the 
leaders of other towns that welcome data centers will likely still believe that big data are their 
shining ray of hope for a better future, despite any broader negative impacts data centers may 
have. As Prineville official Beth Robins asserted, “Facebook encourages us to fly, to reach new 
limits, and we certainly intend to do that.” 
 
In sum, this project suggests that I cannot assure that data centers are entirely positive or 
negative on a local scale at the present time. That said, I can deduce that on a larger, aggregate 
scale, big data companies are important, and they warrant the attention of scholars. While it is 
true that there is not enough data about data centers’ social or environmental impacts, their 
operations are expanding and it is worth questioning just how sustainable such ever-growing 
companies can be. Although data centers’ development has only relatively recently been brought 
to the public’s attention, it is regrettable that so few scholars have taken the time to question 
something so well-entrenched into our everyday lives. Arguably, it is our job to question such 
things. Currently, data centers are the uncontested and unproblematized foundation of the ICT 
industry. If they are not examined, the uneven geographies and the unique power relations that 
big data companies create will not be fully comprehendible—or if need be, combatable. 
Fortunately, several scholars have begun this important work, but many pieces of the 
complicated ICT network remain unexposed. Data centers are a good place to start if we wish to 
understand the profound influence big data companies will have on humans and the environment 
in which we live in the future. I have caught the cloud and pinned it down in one place, but the 
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number of case-studies worthy of examination is rapidly growing. Perhaps the metaphorical 
patchwork quilt does not need to unravel in Prineville, or anywhere else where similar ones are 
sure to be sewn. There is more work to be done on data centers, and I hope geographers will 
realize that they can, and should, take the lead. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The “Green on Facebook” company profile is available at https://www.facebook.com/green/. 
 
2. See Chapter Two for more specific economic impacts of the data centers in Prineville. 
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